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ABSTRACT 
I examine whether an acquirer's financial reporting quality declines after an 
M&A, and if so, how it changes over time. If an acquirer's fmancial information conveys 
inherent information uncertainty, and/or a manager of the firm is not motivated to do 
M&A by economic reasons, I predict that investors rationally create a lower price 
response to financial reporting for the firm, and have difficulty in valuing the firm after 
an M&A. Specifically, I expect acquirers (1) with higher information uncertainty; foreign 
targets, private targets, and inter-industry acquirers, and (2) with agency-motivated 
management to have more severe decline in fmancial reporting, and thus take longer time 
to recover over time following M&As. Using a sample of quarterly data of U.S. public 
acquirers over the period 1991-2010, I find evidence that acquirers experience a decline 
in fmancial reporting quality, measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), and 
that their fmancia1 reports are less value relevant following M&As. Also, I fmd that 
investors keep lower price reactions to fmancial reporting over time while recovering 
their valuations two quarters after M&As. With respect to the ERC results, I fmd that 
investors show lower price response to acquirers with foreign targets than acquirers with 
domestic targets. Also, I fmd that investors think acquirers with private targets experience 
Vl 
less of a decline in financial reporting quality than acquirers with public targets. 
However, I fail to fmd that investors show less investor reaction to the quality of financial 
reporting for inter-industry acquirers later after M&A. With respect to the value 
relevance results, I fmd that the results are similar to the ERC results for foreign and 
private targets, but fmd that the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with inter-
industry targets is lower than that of acquirers with inter-industry targets. For a 
management motivation for M&A, my ERC results show that it is not clear that there is a 
quality difference in financial reporting ofboth agency-motivated and synergy-motivated 
acquirers. With respect to value relevance, investors think the value relevance of earnings 
for agency-motivated acquirers is less than that of synergy-motivated acquirers after 
M&A. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines whether the quality of financial reporting by acquirers 
declines following mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and if so, whether and how the 
quality of financial reporting changes in subsequent periods. M&A are among the most 
important investment decisions of a firm, and combining two entities can significantly 
change the acquirers' fundamental characteristics and reporting environment. Therefore, 
investors may not be sure what is going to happen in financial reporting for acquirers, and 
thus they may be reluctant to show the same level of response to the fmancial 
information. So, investors may show lower response to financial reporting information of 
acquirers after M&A than prior to the M&A. 
Specifically, I focus on two broad explanations for the decline in fmancial 
reporting quality following M&A: information uncertainty and management motivation 
for M&A. Regarding information uncertainty, M&A inherently lead to changes in 
acquirers' fundamental characteristics, such as systematic risk, profitability, and leverage 
because acquirers combine with targets that have different operations, organizational 
structures, and reporting systems. Since the combined entity has higher economic 
uncertainty following the M&A, consolidated financial statements prepared after the 
M&A will have higher information uncertainty than prior to the M&A. As investors 
rationally show a low response to earnings for firms facing high information uncertainty 
(e.g., Ohlson 1995), I expect investors to have less confidence in the financial reporting 
of acquirers following M&A because of the increased information uncertainty for those 
1 
firms. 1 
As a determinant for information uncertainty, I first investigate whether the 
nationality of targets is an important factor for investors to understand acquirers' 
financial reporting practices. When a U.S. firm takes over a foreign target firm, 
converting and combining the accounting figures of targets that use different accounting 
principles than US GAAP may result in difficulty for acquirers to create consistent 
consolidated financial statements immediately after the M&A. Therefore, I expect U.S. 
acquirers of foreign targets to face more severe declines in fmancial reporting quality 
following M&A. Secondly, I test for a differential effect of the public status of targets on 
the fmancial reporting quality of acquirers. Unregulated or unaudited information from 
acquiring private targets may raise information uncertainty among acquirers, and thus a 
more pronounced decrease in fmancial reporting quality is expected following M&A for 
such firms. Finally, cross-sectional differences between acquirers may also heighten 
information uncertainty during the M&A process. Well-diversified acquirers generally 
have experience in operating in different industries and accumulate know-how about 
multiple industries. Undiversified firms will lack such knowledge and experience. Thus, 
less diversified firms acquiring targets in a different industry are likely to have more 
information uncertainty related to the operational perspective during the M&A process 
than other acquirers.2 So, investors may show a lower response to financial reporting of 
such acquirers after M&A than that prior to M&A. 
1 I defme less confidence in the quality of financial reporting as belief in lower quality of 
fmancial statements. 
2 Other firms include more diversified acquirers with targets in both the same and different 
2 
Regarding management motivation for M&A, if M&A is not motivated by 
economic reasons, but by managers' own potential benefits, then managers of acquirers 
may modify the firm's reporting environment following M&A. During the M&A process, 
various accounting estimates are made about the fair value of consolidated assets and 
liabilities as well as accounting treatments that may differ from those of the acquirers. If 
investors believe managers' reasons for seeking an M&A are not in line with investors' 
benefits, they are more likely to have less confidence in fmancial information released by 
the acquirer after M&A. 
If investors believe that the M&A is a result of management effort seeking 
operational efficiency for acquirers, which I refer to as synergy-motivated M&A, then 
their reaction to the M&A would be positive. 3 Once investors believe that the M&A will 
lead to synergy for an acquirer, they may also believe in the quality offmancial reporting 
after M&A. On the other hand, if investors consider an M&A not to be in line with 
shareholders' benefits, that is, a result of management effort seeking their own benefits, 
which I defmed as agency-motivated M&A, then investors would react negatively to the 
M&A. Since the manager of the acquirer may have pressure to prove their M&A decision 
was right, the manager involved in the agency-motivated M&A would be more likely to 
have incentive to manipulate financial statements after M&A than the one in synergy-
motivated M&A (Bens et al. 201 02). Taken together, investors may believe the quality of 
industries, and less diversified acquirers with targets in the same industry. Hereafter, to make 
terminology simple in this paper, intra-industry acquirers are used for all these acquirers, and 
inter-industry acquirers are less diversified acquirers with targets in a different industry. 
3 Following Barragato and Markelevich (2008), I use synergy-motivated (agency-motivated) 
M&A for takeovers motivated by synergy (agency). 
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financial reporting of acquirers involved in agency motivated-M&A is much lower than 
that of acquirers involved in synergy-motivated M&A after M&A. 
However, the decline in financial reporting quality after M&A may not last over 
the long term. In subsequent periods after M&A, information uncertainty about acquirers 
and targets may be resolved as investors increase scrutiny of acquirers, and come to 
better understand acquirers' consolidated fmancial statements. Also, since low quality in 
financial reporting results in decrease in the stock prices of a firm (Francis et al. 2004; 
Francis et al. 2008), and manager's compensation and job security are related to stock 
prices, the manager of such firm will attempt to provide informative financial information 
following M&A, and may try to improve the fmancial reporting quality over time. 4 Then, 
investors will more carefully weigh up fmancial information relating to the acquirer in 
subsequent periods (Francis et al. 2007). Taken together, a decline in fmancial reporting 
quality after M&A may not be permanent and recover in subsequent periods. 
This study examines the differences in the quality of fmancial reports before and 
after M&A using two market-based measures. First, the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) is used to measure investors' reaction to unexpected earnings of acquirers at the 
time of the earnings announcement. 5 ERC is a measure of association between stock 
returns and earnings, and among various market-based proxies for earnings quality, it is 
the most commonly used measure (Dechow et al. 201 0). So, I believe this ERC is the best 
4 Since managers of manipulated acquirers do not want the manipulation to be detected, their 
incentive to misreport financial information may not be as strong as before. 
5 Earnings is one of the most important accounting numbers for investors to understand in 
fmancial reporting, so earnings quality and financial reporting quality are interchangeably used in 
this study. 
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direct measure to investigate how investors perceive the quality of fmancial reports of 
acquirers within short windows around earnings announcements. Second, I utilize 
Ohlson's (1995) valuation framework to examine whether investors' valuation of 
acquirers decreases after M&A. If the earnings and book value of a firm effectively 
explain the current stock price, then the financial information of the firm is believed to be 
informative with regard to the firm's value. So, I use the price-earnings model to examine 
and compare the R-squares of each quarter to determine whether information uncertainty 
and management motivation for M&A after M&A decreases the value relevance of 
financial reporting for acquirers after M&A. In addition, I use the price-earnings model to 
investigate whether the value relevance of earnings declines after M&A. Overall, I 
investigate whether acquirers' ERCs and valuations (value relevance of combined 
earnings and book value and value relevance of earnings) decline immediately after 
M&A, in comparison with the values found before M&A, and whether the financial 
reporting quality of acquirers improves for eight quarters after M&A. 
I identify completed M&A transactions from the M&A database of the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) from the beginning of 1991 to the end of 2010, I use a sample of 
5,706 fum-quarters and 3,610 unique firms for the ERC analysis and 9,207 firm-quarters 
and 5,545 unique firms for the valuation analysis for U.S. public acquirers with U.S. 
public or private, or foreign public or private targets. The results from my analyses using 
the ERC measure show a decline in fmancial reporting quality following M&A. More 
specifically, I fmd this ERC result for the full sample and for acquirers of foreign targets. 
This reveals that investors appear to have less confidence in the quality of financial 
5 
reporting of acquirers with foreign targets immediately after M&A. However, the ERC 
results for firms acquiring private targets show a smaller decrease following M&A 
compared with firms with public targets, indicating that investors lose less confidence in 
the fmancial reporting quality of firms with private targets than firms with public targets 
after M&A, which is contrary to my prediction. This may be because the first information 
released of private targets raises investor reaction after M&A. Also, I fail to fmd that 
investors may lose more confidence in the fmancial reporting quality of inter-industry 
acquirers than intra-industry acquirers immediately after M&A. Lastly, the ERC results 
for both synergy-motivated and agency-motivated acquirers show a decline in fmancial 
reporting quality, but it is not clear which acquirers investors lose less confidence in the 
quality of financial information. 
My results on recovery of the ERC measure reveal that a decline in financial 
reporting continues in subsequent periods. The result for the full sample shows that 
investors still do not recover their belief in financial statement of acquirers over time. In 
subsample tests, the ERC of acquirers of foreign targets show more or less ERC than 
acquirers of domestic targets, suggesting that it is not clear that investors differentiate the 
quality of financial reporting between both acquirers. However, acquirers of foreign 
targets show slightly less ERC measure in subsequent quarters than one prior to the M&A 
while acquirers of domestic targets show significantly less ERC measure in subsequent 
quarters than one prior to the M&A, indicating that investors appear to recover the 
declined belief in fmancial statements for acquirers of foreign targets, but do not recover 
in fmancial statements for acquirers of domestics targets. The results of the continuing 
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decline in ERC for acquirers of private targets in subsequent quarters show that investors 
do not believe that acquirers of private targets have the same quality in financial reporting 
as one prior to the M&A. However, the ERC of acquirers of public targets show the 
recovered investors' belief in fmancial statements in some point after M&A. In the results 
of intra- versus inter-industry acquirers and synergy-motivated versus agency-motivated 
acquirers, the result of no difference in the decline in the ERC between these acquirers 
suggests that investors do not differentiate in their beliefs in the quality of fmancial 
reporting of these acquirers in subsequent periods. 
The results for value relevance show that acquirers experience a loss in the value 
relevance of their fmancial statements during the first quarter following M&A, but 
recover in subsequent periods. The subsample test for firms with domestic and foreign 
targets shows that acquirers with foreign targets experience a lower decline in the value 
relevance of earnings immediately after M&A. The value relevance test for firms with 
private targets provides similar evidence as having a smaller decline in the value 
relevance of earnings than firms with public targets in the first quarter following M&A. 
The last test related to the information uncertainty view, intra- versus inter-industry 
acquirers, also reveals that inter-industry acquirers show much less value relevance in 
earnings than intra-industry acquirers immediately after M&A, which is consistent with 
my expectation. The results for the management motivation for M&A view also show 
that agency-motivated firms have lower value relevance of earnings than synergy-
motivated acquirers after M&A, which is consistent with my expectation. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature related to fmancial reporting 
7 
quality by examining the quality of financial information for acquirers after M&A. 
Unlike previous studies examining market reactions to M&A announcements (e.g., John 
et al. 2010), this study investigates how M&A consolidations influence financial 
reporting quality by looking at ERC and value relevance. Furthermore, while previous 
researchers have looked at the quality of fmancial reporting from the perspective of 
earnings management or fmancial misstatements (e.g., Barragato and Markelevich 2008; 
Bens et al. 2012), this study expands the M&A consolidation effect on the quality of 
financial reporting by differentiating the characteristics of acquirers and targets, and 
having a management motivation for M&A 
By using two different measures of investor reaction to the quality of fmancial 
reporting of acquirers, this study provides an opportunity to examine whether the 
measure with the short measurement windows and expectation (the ERC) is different 
from one with the long measurement windows and expectation (the valuation). This study 
fmds the immediate decline of fmancial reporting quality after M&A with both measures. 
However, the difference between the ERC results of lack of recovery of the quality in 
fmancial reporting and the quick recovery of the earnings in the valuation models may be 
attributed to the short measurement window and the incorporation of market expectation 
of earnings (i.e., using an unexpected earnings measure) in the ERC analysis versus the 
use of an earnings measure without incorporating expectations and a long-window 
analysis in the valuation models. 
Moreover, examining quarterly intervals for financial reporting quality following 
M&A in this study allows for a more comprehensive view of the change in quality over 
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time compared with an annual cross-sectional examination. If we investigate the effect of 
M&A on the quality of financial reporting on an annual basis, information uncertainty 
and management motivation for M&A effects may be teased out during a relatively 
longer time window and by rigorous annual audit. To examine the immediate effect (or 
short term effect) ofM&A on financial reporting quality, investigating the financial 
reporting quality of acquirers on a quarterly basis in this study provides better setting for 
the test. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as followings. Section 2 describes the 
literature review of M&A as well as quality of financial reporting. The hypotheses are 
developed in Section 3. Section 4 provides the outline ofthe research design. The sample 
selection and data are described in Section 5. Section 6 shows the main empirical results. 
Additional analyses are presented in Section 7. Section 8 summarizes of this study and 
concluding remarks. Appendix 1 provides a definition of each variable used in the main 
empirical tests. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Previous M&A Research on Financial Reporting Quality 
Previous studies on M&A can be separated into two main approaches focusing on 
estimating and evaluating M&A-related changes in firm performance. The first approach 
compares the pre- and post-M&A performance of two merged firms to investigate 
whether the M&A transactions result in any changes in reported costs, revenue, or profit 
numbers (e.g., Healy et al. 1992; Calomiris and Karceski 2000). The second approach 
examines stock market reactions to M&A announcements (e.g., John et al. 2010; Ellis et 
9 
al. 2012; McNichols and Stubben 2014). 
Kothari (200 1) argues that M&A results in inappropriate financial statements that 
do not provide good information for future sales and earnings. He also states that 
financial statements provided after such significant fundamental changes may not be 
useful or accurately represent market values. However, few researchers have provided 
evidence of a change in the quality of fmancial reporting following M&A. Christian and 
Jones (2004) examine whether the measure of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is more useful for predicting an acquirer's 
future earnings than earnings itself. They argue that inherent uncertainty due to a mixture 
of two different earnings streams generates decreased earnings usefulness during M&A. 
Their study regarding reduced value relevance of earnings show that it is more difficult 
for investors to understand the earnings of acquirers during M&A than with EBITDA. 
Barragato and Markelevich (2008) predict that managers who pursue a more efficient and 
more appropriate allocation of capital have a different economic environment and 
incentive scheme than firms that pursue their own benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
They find evidence that managers motivated more by their own self-interest (agency-
motivated acquisitions) manage earnings differently than managers with more incentive 
to be efficient, and focus on the allocation of capital (synergy-motivated acquisitions) 
following M&A. In a recent study, Bens et al. (2012) document that managers change 
their fmancial reporting decisions when they encounter pressure concerning their 
investment decisions. Their study finds that managers under pressure are more likely to 
misreport their fmancial statements following M&A. 
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2.2. Characteristics of Acquirers and Targets in M&A and Financial Reporting Quality 
2.2.1. Foreign Targets in M&A 
Researchers have also examined various characteristics of various M&A acquirers 
and targets. These studies examine each M&A to estimate the gain or loss associated with 
the acquirer and target characteristics in order to understand the overall gain or loss from 
a transaction. These studies focus on acquirers' stock returns in order to assess whether 
global diversification benefits shareholders, and provide mixed results. Some studies 
indicate that cross-border M&A benefits shareholders while others provide evidence that 
acquiring foreign targets through M&A transactions destroys firm value. For example, 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) find evidence that firms acquiring targets in a geographically 
different market have higher stock market returns than firms acquiring domestic targets. 
They argue that this is consistent with the view that firms increase their value by 
expanding their operational network. Eun et al. (1996) also provide evidence that 
shareholders of foreign firms acquiring U.S. targets generally obtain wealth gains, 
indicating that cross-border M&A provides a synergistic effect for acquirers. Ellis et al. 
(2012) find that acquirers from better-governed countries experience more gains from 
M&A transactions, and that the gains are higher when targets are from countries with less 
optimal governments. They also fmd that global factors affect M&A returns at least as 
much as acquirers' country factors do. In contrast, Denis et al. (2002) fmd that global 
diversification results in value destruction. By looking at the changes in excess value 
related to changes in global diversification, their results show that increased global 
11 
diversification reduces excess value, whereas decreased global diversification raises 
excess value. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) look at U.S. firms acquiring foreign 
firms and find that such firms have lower stock returns than firms acquiring domestic 
firms . They suggest that lower stock returns come from transactions that increase global 
diversification. Also, Black et al. (2007) document that U.S. acquirers engaging in cross-
border M&A experience more negative long-term abnormal returns than those that 
acquire domestic firms after M&A. 
2.2.2. U.S. GAAP and foreign GAAP 
When consolidating the financial statements of U.S. acquirers and foreign targets, 
differences in the accounting standards of the acquirers and targets may raise issues in 
terms of converting accounting figures created under foreign accounting standards into 
standards that meet U.S. GAAP requirements. Some previous studies in the accounting 
literature indicate that earnings prepared under the GAAP in certain foreign countries are 
as useful and informative to U.S. investors as those prepared according to U.S. GAAP 
(Baumol and Malkiell993; Bandyopadhyay et al. 1994). However, other studies show 
that earnings reported under foreign GAAP are differently informative from earnings 
reconciled to U.S. GAAP (Amir et al. 1993; Chan et al. 1996). Thus, comparability 
among accounting standards has been an issue for evaluating firms from different 
countries for decades. In an attempt to harmonize accounting through a common business 
language that is understandable and comparable across countries in Europe, the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were established in 2001. As a result, 
12 
recent empirical studies show that IFRS is similarly informative to U.S. GAAP (e.g., 
Bartov et al. 2005).6 
2.2.3. Private Targets 
Several existing studies show that firms normally experience small or negative 
stock returns when acquiring public firms, but obtain positive gains in M&A transactions 
with private targets (e.g., Andrade et al. 2001; Ang and Kohlers 2001; Fuller et al. 2002; 
Moeller et al. 2004). This effect, along with high valuation of public targets compared to 
private targets, indicates that public firms have more bargaining power than private 
targets. This difference between public and private firms comes from the lack of 
disclosed information about private targets, eventually causing adverse selection 
problems for a firm (Diamond and Verrecchia 1981). 
2.2.4. Public and Private Firms 
Prior researchers have also examined whether the difference between private and 
public firms results in differences in financial reporting quality. While public firms are 
required to disclose fmancial information and any information related to management in 
periodic reports, private firms are not required to disclose their fmancial statements. 
Therefore, public firms release more information about themselves to the public than 
private firms do. Furthermore, Burgstahler et al. (2006) argue that private firms do not 
6 This study examines whether acquirers experience more severe transformation and combination 
problems in aggregating fmancial statements when acquirers operate under different accounting 
standards. The individual reporting quality of targets is expected to have an insignificant effect on 
the financial reporting quality of acquirers. Also, accounting standards are applications affected 
by other institutional settings such as litigation and regulations, so they themselves can represent 
the effects of reporting on financial reporting quality. 
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have an incentive to provide fmancial statements to the public, providing evidence that 
private firms are more likely to manage earnings than public firms. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) examine the market demand for financial reporting quality in the UK, which has 
equivalent regulations on auditing, accounting standards, and taxes for both public and 
private firms, and find that the market demands lower financial reporting quality for 
private firms than for public firms. Thus, they conclude that private firms' fmancial 
reports are more likely to be affected by tax objectives and dividend policy. 
When investors' information about private firms is limited, the role of earnings as 
an indicator of firm performance is reduced. While all firms (including public and private 
firms) are generally expected to maximize their earnings in reports, private firms have 
incentives to exaggerate expenses and minimize earnings in reports (Gaughan 2010). This 
difference between private and public firms makes it difficult for investors to obtain 
accurate fmancial information about private firms. Given the lack of information about 
private firms, firms going public (i.e., initial public offering) may be a credible signal of 
financial reporting quality for such firms. Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) and Reuer and 
Shen (2003) document that the shareholders of private firms are motivated to take the 
firm public and then divest. When private firms go public, they have to obtain support 
from investment banks, and also bear registration and disclosure costs. This process can 
thus be a method of reducing uncertainty about private firms. Baik et al. (2007) argue that 
acquirers have more pricing uncertainty for private targets than for public ones, so they 
try to discount payments for private targets, and thus manipulate earnings before the 
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M&A. They fmd that acquirers are more likely to manage earnings when facing stock-
based M&A transactions with private targets. 
2.2.5. Management Motivation for M&A 
Some researchers have linked management motivation for M&A with the quality 
of earnings (financial statements). Barragato and Markelevich (2008) fmd that managers 
pursuing better operational and financial efficiency have higher earnings quality, and 
have a different economic environment and incentive scheme than managers who pursue 
their own benefits at the expense of shareholders. Bens et al. (2012) also document that 
managers change their financial reporting decisions when they encounter pressure related 
to investment. 
Other studies document that the managers of acquirers have an incentive to 
manipulate earnings in order to strengthen their negotiating positions, especially with 
stock-for-stock M&A agreements (before M&A announcements). Erickson et al. (1999) 
investigate whether acquirers try to boost their stock price before a stock-financed M&A 
announcement, and find that managers facing future M&A transactions manage earnings 
in order to have a better negotiating position. Louis (2004) also fmds evidence that 
acquirers expecting future M&A transactions (by financing with their high stock price) 
manipulate their earnings before the M&A announcement, with the effect of this earnings 
management reversed over time after the M&A announcement. He argues that this 
explains the poor performance of acquirers after the M&A announcement. Earnings 
management before the M&A announcements results not only in the reversal effect of the 
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stock price but also in lawsuits after M&A announcements. Gong et al. (2008) find a 
positive association between stock-for-stock M&A abnormal accruals and post-M&A 
announcement lawsuits for acquirers, and the market reaction on an M&A announcement 
is negatively related to lawsuits after M&A. Gong et al. (2008) argue that market reaction 
to M&A announcements reflects the possibility of future lawsuits after M&A. 
2.2.6. Misstatement in Financial Reports 
Following Jensen's (1986) study, a number of studies in the fmance literature have 
shown that firm managers would like to increase firm size through investment, such as 
M&A. However, ifM&A decisions are motivated by hubris, and management is 
overconfident that it can manage the targets more efficiently and productively, then 
inefficiency of investment occurs. According to agency theory, managers are encouraged 
to align with shareholders' benefits to maximize firm value, but this maximization of firm 
value may pressure management to do so at any expense. Some previous studies provide 
evidence that the pressure from maximization of firm value contributes to misstatements 
on fmancial statements (Verweire and Berghe 2004; Ramamoorti 2008), while other 
researchers do not find a relation between management incentives and fmancial 
misreporting (Erickson et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2010). In addition to management 
compensation, managers may feel pressure to ensure their investment decisions reach 
fruition (Jensen 2005), and managers facing significant corporate events such as M&A 
may want to prove that their choices were appropriate. 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Decline ofFinancial Reporting Quality 
M&A may result in high information uncertainty. As a significant investment 
decision, M&A changes acquirers' operations, risks, leverage, profitability, and 
organizational structures, resulting in changes in cash flow statements and accounts 
shown on other fmancial statements. For instance, goodwill increased through M&A may 
be reflected in the balance sheets of an acquirer, while only partial cash amounts paid for 
the asset may be reflected in cash flow statements. In addition, a certain amount of 
earnings comes from changes in cash and assets by M&A, but it is not possible for 
earnings to directly reflect the effects of the merged assets. As such, acquirers inherently 
face information uncertainty in fmancial reporting systems. 7 
As the precision of earnings information (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988) and a 
firm's earnings information system (Choi and Salamon 1989) affect investors' responses 
to earnings, the inherent information uncertainty of acquirers' earnings after M&A may 
impact investors' reactions to consolidated earnings. I posit that investors may try to 
7 One may argue that this inherent information uncertainty may also be caused by measurement 
errors during the integration process after M&A, not by investors' perceptions of information 
released after M&A. Since M&A involves different accounting treatments between two entities, 
there may be some estimation errors for assets and/or liabilities under the different accounting 
methods during the transformation of accounting numbers. However, acquirers usually have a due 
diligence period, which allows them to have more access to private information concerning 
targets' operational and financial status, such as accounting estimates and revenue recognition 
policies. So, if acquirers recognize a serious problem in the verification of such information 
during due diligence, or misstatements, which is not in accordance with GAAP, then the M&A 
deal can be terminated (Skaife and Wangerin 2013). Therefore, ifacquirers investigate the targets 
extensively during this due diligence and are satisfied with the information they obtain, it is 
unlikely there would be a measurement error in consolidating the financial statements of the two 
entities. 
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obtain private information related to M&A that can be useful for understanding the 
fmancial statements of acquirers if there is a higher level of information uncertainty in the 
post-M&A period than in the pre-M&A period. Therefore, rational investors are expected 
to have a lower response to the public fmancial reporting of firms with high information 
uncertainty. Zhang (2006) argues that this psychological bias explains anomalous returns 
after forecast revisions. But in this study, I follow Brav and Heaton's (2002) uncertainty 
model, which suggests investors will put a lower valuation weight on firm information 
after a structural change in the firm. Therefore, I argue that firms facing information 
uncertainty may be perceived to have a decline of fmancial reporting quality after M&A. 
Managers of acquirers may also have different motivation for M&A. Some 
managers seek operational or financial efficiency by acquiring targets. Their ultimate 
purpose of doing M&A lies along with profit maximization for investors. Investors may 
be able to understand the potential of these M&A transactions, and assign higher values 
to these M&As. However, other managers may seek their own. benefits by acquiring 
targets. They try to acquirer targets to expand their business and to make an empire of the 
firm, or to mix targets' financial numbers to hide financial misstatement. Investors may 
be aware of these M&As, and then likely would consider the quality of financial 
statements for these firms to be lower after M&A. 
The effect of information uncertainty and management motivation for M&A is 
not mutually exclusive. If there is high information uncertainty, managers may use this 
opportunity to manage reported earnings. Even if managers face high information 
uncertainty, they may not manage reported earnings or may have a lower incentive to do 
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so when they face high detection risk for the misstatements. In the same vein, 
management motivation for M&A does not necessarily lead to high information 
uncertainty. If investors acknowledge the possible manipulation of financial statements, 
information uncertainty may be reduced because investors investigate intensively the 
M&A and understand financial reporting of acquirers well from information released 
after M&A. For example, if acquirers seek operational synergy by acquiring foreign 
targets, then the managers of the acquirers have the same interests as the acquirers' 
shareholders, and the acquirers are more likely to perform well in the future (Markelevich 
2003). Accordingly, they are less likely to have earnings management (Barragato and 
Markelevich 2008). Since cross-border M&A will incur frictions such as transaction 
costs, information asymmetries, and agency conflicts from different laws and 
enforcement, if the acquirers take these risks and complete their cross-border M&As, 
then investors may see the potential synergy effect at first. The initial synergy effect may 
dominate information uncertainty due to foreign targets immediately after M&A. Taken 
together, information uncertainty and management motivation for M&A may lead to 
lower investor response to fmancial reporting after M&A than before M&A. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis is as follows. 
Hl: The financial reporting quality of acquirers declines after M&A. 
The inherent information uncertainty after M&A may not be permanent. 
Managers of acquirers can become accustomed to the combined business, and thus may 
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be able to improve their ability to estimate the fair value of its assets and liabilities. 
Therefore, investors may believe fmancial statements are more credible after a certain 
time has passed after the M&A. Once the information uncertainty has been resolved over 
time, the market will weigh the information provided by the acquirers more heavily in 
subsequent periods (Francis et al. 2007). Also, managers may try to avoid detection risk 
for the misstatements over time. Taken together, the decline in financial reporting quality 
after M&A may be eliminated in subsequent earnings. 
3.1.2. Foreign versus Domestic Targets 
The literature indicates that the global expansion of acquirers may lead to high 
stock prices from an operational synergy effect (Doukas and Tarvlos 1988; Eun et al. 
1996), but may also destroy firm value (Denis et al. 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann 
2005). However, when a firm acquires another firm for which fmancial statements have 
been prepared under different accounting standards, the acquirer will experience a 
fundamental accounting transition as well as a change in organizational structure and a 
combination of operations. The acquirer must convert the target's accounting figures, 
which come from a different reporting environment, to values that conform to its own. As 
such, acquiring a firm that follows different reporting requirements may not guarantee the 
quality of financial statements after M&A. 8 
8 Reporting environments involve accounting standards, regulations, tax laws, and litigation. 
These features interact with each other and the combination of their effects is reflected in the 
application of accounting standards (Barth et al. 2008). 
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In cross-border M&A (e.g., U.S. acquirer and foreign target), the accounting 
standards applied to the combined firm are based on the location ofthe acquirer. If U.S. 
firms acquire firms from other countries, and acquisitions are more than 50% of the 
voting shares ofthe target, the U.S. acquirer is expected to follow U.S. GAAP for its 
consolidated financial statements. In consolidating the financial statements of U.S. 
acquirers and foreign targets, the differences in accounting standards of the acquirers and 
targets may raise issues in terms of converting accounting figures created under foreign 
accounting standards into values that meet U.S. GAAP requirements. 
In an attempt to harmonize accounting through a common business language that 
is understandable and comparable across countries in Europe, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) were established in 2001. Recent empirical studies show that 
IFRS is as informative to investors as U.S. GAAP (e.g., Bartov et al. 2005). However, in 
spite of efforts to harmonize accounting standards, there are still differences to impact 
consolidation of the fmancial statements in U.S. GAAP and IFRS. First, U.S. GAAP and 
IFRS take different approaches to setting standards. More specifically, while U.S. GAAP 
is based on rules and provides specific guidance, IFRS is based on principles and offers 
limited guidance (Schipper 2003). As such, U.S. GAAP includes implementation 
guidelines and a variety of exceptions, while IFRS is more likely to rely on professional 
expertise to judge accounting treatments. Additionally, U.S. GAAP and IFRS differ with 
regard to some specific aspects of accounting. For example, while U.S. GAAP allows 
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both LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) and FIFO (First-In, First-Out), IFRS bans LIF0. 9 
Given the ongoing harmonization process between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, if a 
U.S. firm acquires another firm operating under IFRS, financial reporting for the 
combined firm may involve information uncertainty. Even if the manager of the U.S. 
acquirer knows how to convert accounts under IFRS to accounts under U.S. GAAP, 
executing the conversion may take more time than expected. Therefore, the fmancial 
reporting quality of U.S. firms acquiring foreign GAAP firms may be lower than that of 
U.S. firms acquiring U.S. GAAP firms. In this case, the duration of decline would be 
longer in cross-border M&A compared with domestic M&A. This leads to a second 
hypothesis. 10 
H2a: The financial reporting quality of acquirers with foreign targets declines 
more markedly after M&A than the financial reporting quality of acquirers 
with domestic targets. 
3.1.3. Private versus Public Targets 
Public firms are required to disclose financial information and any information 
related to management in periodic reports. In contrast, private firms are not required to 
disclose their fmancial statements. Public firms inherently release more information 
9 If a U.S. acquirer employs LIFO, and a target utilizes IFRS (which bans LIFO) and FIFO as its 
inventory cost method, the FIFO figures of the target need to be converted to LIFO figures. 
However, the inventory cost method involves multiple years, so converting the old figures is time 
consuming and costly. 
10 Moreover, the auditors of acquirers may have more difficulty communicating with the staff of 
targets outside their geographical territory than with those inside it. In such situations, the 
auditors may have to spend more time detecting and fixing misstatements in financial reports 
following M&A. 
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about themselves than private firms, so private firms are less likely to have access to the 
public capital market than public firms because they have more information uncertainty 
due to lack of disclosure (Diamond and V errechia 1991 ). In addition, private firms with 
limited information may easily hide negative information compared with public firms. If 
they are under fmancial distress and cannot access the capital market, which requires 
firms to have intensive scrutiny for registration, they may prefer to sell privately 
throughout M&A. Furthermore, private firms do not have an incentive to make fmancial 
statements public, and thus are more likely to have earnings management (Burgstahler et 
al. 2006) and financial reports that are affected by tax objectives and dividend policy 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Accordingly, private firms are more likely to have a lower 
quality of financial reporting than public firms. 
As such, if a firm governed by a certain disclosure regulation (public firms) 
acquires another firm that has not been required to comply with the same regulation 
(private firms), the acquirer may have to spend time altering the accounting of the target 
to match that of its own following M&A. For example, public acquirers are subject to 
internal control reporting rules, and thus would more likely have a heightened concern 
over internal controls when acquiring a private target. As a result, the acquirer may face 
increased information uncertainty after M&A, and investors may rationally believe the 
financial reporting quality will deteriorate more than that in a firm acquiring a public firm 
after M&A. This leads to my next hypothesis. 
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H2b: The fmancial reporting quality of acquirers with private targets declines 
more markedly after M&A than the financial reporting quality of acquirers 
with public targets. 
3 .1.4. Inter-industry versus Intra-industry Acquirers 
Firms grow and reorganize their assets by joining with other firms, expanding 
their operating industry through M&A. When acquiring another firm, they decide which 
of the target's facilities should be discontinued and which comparative advantage 
between acquirers and targets should be taken following the transaction. Some firms 
acquire targets in the same industry, and maintain the target's operational plants 
(Maksimovic et al. 2011) while others diversify and manage targets in a different 
industry. If a firm acquires another firm in the same industry, it may not result in higher 
information uncertainty after M&A regardless of the level of diversification of acquirers 
because the finn already knows how to operate the target and easily combine the 
fmancial statements of the finn. However, when a finn acquires a target in a different 
industry, it may not know how to absorb the operations and accounting practices of the 
target without any difficulty after M&A. So, the firm may face high information 
uncertainty after M&A. 
If an acquirer succeeds in diversifying (in regards to industry), the finn survives 
and expands its operations in that other industry. Once the acquirer is diversified, which 
means the firm is successfully involved in several industries either through its own 
operations or through subsidiaries, the firm may be more likely to operate the target 
better than a non-diversified firm. Highly performing acquirers build diversified 
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conglomerates by raising investment and know-how relating to targets (Steiner 1976; 
Meeks 1977), and more diversified firms may be better able to combine operations and 
accounting of targets, reducing information uncertainty from M&A. Such firms are 
expected to have higher-quality financial statements after M&A than less diversified 
acquirers. Combined together, a less diversified acquirer with a target in a different 
industry (inter-industry acquirer) may have higher information uncertainty than a less 
diversified acquirer with a target in the same industry or a more diversified acquirer with 
a target either in a different industry or the same one (intra-industry acquirer). This leads 
to the next hypothesis. 
H2c: The financial reporting quality of less diversified acquirers with targets in a 
different industry declines more markedly after M&A than the fmancial 
reporting quality of other acquirers. 
3.2. Management Motivation for M&A 
Management compensation incentives are positively linked with financial 
misstatements because they provide managers with benefits when high performance is 
observed (Burns and Kedia 2006). On the other hand, managers also have an incentive to 
undertake "big baths" because of the presence of "floors" in their bonus plans (Healy 
1985). Similarly, managers are linked with investment-related decisions such as M&A. 
some managers of acquirers have an incentive to enter into takeovers to hide their poor 
performance as long as their current and long-term performance-based compensation is 
enhanced (Erickson et al. 2012), while other managers may seek operational and fmancial 
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efficiency through M&A. Therefore, the economic goals for such managers of acquirers 
(agency-motivated acquirers) may differ from those of efficient managers of acquirers 
(synergy-motivated acquirers ). 
If managers' purpose is not in line with investors' benefits, managers of acquirers 
are more likely to have more incentives to misstate fmancial information following M&A 
(agency-motivated acquirers). The managers of such acquirers try to avoid penalties they 
may incur if their investment decision turns out to be poor after the first M&A. Then, 
investors may expect such firms to manipulate fmancial statements following M&A. 11 
Given this, investors would lose confidence in the financial reports of such firms 
following M&A. 
Prior studies fmd that managers of acquirers have incentives to manipulate 
earnings to strengthen their negotiating positions during stock-for-stock M&A 
agreements (before M&A announcements; e.g., Erickson et al. 1999; Louis 2004; Gong 
et al. 2008). However, earnings management may not be possible before stock-for-stock 
M&A. First, investors may increase their scrutiny of related firms around the time of 
M&A, and may be exposed to rumors about M&A transactions. Given this, M&A firms 
may face higher litigation and regulatory risks around the time ofM&A, so it is unlikely 
that firms will engage in earnings management before M&A (Ball and Shivakumar 
2008). Second, the discretionary accruals that previous researchers have considered with 
regard to earnings management may be the consequence of firm operations aimed at 
preparing for the major corporate event ofM&A. Therefore, these measures are not 
II Bens et al. (2012) find that firms with a negative evaluation at the time of the M&A 
announcement are more likely to restate their financial statements in subsequent periods. 
26 
reliable indicators of earnings management before M&A. Third, discretionary accruals in 
past studies have measurement problems, as discussed by Hribar and Collins (2002) and 
Kothari et al. (2005). Furthermore, Pungaliya and Vijh (2009) fmd that no earnings 
management occurs before stock-for-stock M&A after correcting for misspecification in 
earnings management measures. Therefore, if earning management is not possible before 
M&A, there may be a greater decline in financial reporting quality for agency-motivated 
firms, which require more time to recover in subsequent quarters. The fmal hypothesis in 
the present study is as follows. 
H3: The financial reporting quality of agency-motivated M&A declines more 
markedly after M&A than the financial reporting quality of synergy-
motivated M&A. 
4. Research Design 
4.1. Test Period 
In the present study, financial reporting quality is measured on a quarterly basis 
around M&A completion. If an M&A is completed before the end of a quarter, the 
financial data of the first quarter after M&A completion is used for the first measure of 
financial reporting quality for the combined firms. In some cases, the M&A is announced 
before the end of a quarter or between the end of a quarter and the earnings 
announcement for the quarter, but is completed after the end ofthe quarter. In such cases, 
the fmancial data of the next quarter is used for the first fmancial reporting quality 
measure for the combined firms. 
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4.2. Market Reaction to M&A Announcement and Completion 
The first public information about an M&A transaction is released at the M&A 
announcement. Prior studies in accounting and finance have focused on M&A 
announcements, measuring whether and how the market reacts to M&A information that 
is announced (e.g., Gong et al. 2008; McNichols and Stubben 2014). Even though the 
market may expect firms with excess cash to acquire other firms, M&A announcements, 
as new firm-generated information, are the most significant M&A-related events 
affecting market responses to firms. When the M&A is announced, there is no prediction 
of measurement error or misstatements after M&A, but investors can anticipate the future 
effect of M&A. In contrast, M&A completions confirm that the announced M&A 
transactions have been closed successfully. After M&A completion, the combined figures 
of the acquirers and targets start to become effective for the combined firm. However, the 
market can also consider the financial reporting of the combined firm for the first quarter 
after M&A completion in order to understand the first consolidation effects of M&A, 
rather than the M&A completion itself. This study investigates whether the market reacts 
to the fmancial reporting of acquirers in the first quarter after M&A completion. 
4.3. Financial Reporting Quality Measures 
In most prior studies, abnormal accruals are used to measure earnings 
management before M&A (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Gong et al. 2008), 
although Haw et al. (1994) use analyst forecast errors for forecast accuracy, and Bens et 
al. (2012) use incurrences of financial restatements to capture manager misreporting 
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following M&A. To measure financial reporting quality itself, a proxy using accounting 
fundamentals such as abnormal accruals may be useful, but I focus on investor 
perceptions concerning information released after M&A. So, in this study, the earnings 
response coefficient is used to measure financial reporting quality because earnings are 
an important part of fmancial reporting. I also use the price-earnings model suggested by 
Ohlson (1995) to measure the value relevance of earnings and the book value to report 
financial reporting quality for acquirers. 
4.3.1. Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) 
The earnings response coefficient (ERC) is a measure of association between 
stock returns and earnings. The theory ofHolthausen and Verrecchia (1988) assumes that 
investor responsiveness to earnings can be direct evidence of how informative earnings 
are to investors. Among various market-based proxies for earnings quality, ERC is the 
most commonly used measure (Dechow et al. 201 0). ERC is measured over multiple 
quarters after M&A to investigate whether acquirers' ERCs decline after M&A, in 
comparison with the values found before M&A. I compare the ERC around the last 
earnings announcement (t=O) prior to M&A with the ERC values around the subsequent 
earnings announcement (t=1, ... , 8) after M&A. This study investigates whether the 
financial reporting quality of acquirers declines and recovers following M&A, so an 
indicator variable for different earnings announcements (t=O and t=1, ... , 8) is used, with 
multiple regression of the cumulative abnormal returns on unexpected earnings 
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controlling for other variables. The following regression is used to test the first 
hypothesis. 
CARit = a1 + L~=1 a2,t QTit + fh UEit + L~=l fJ z,tu E it * QT it+ ControlSit + Eit 
where ControlSit = yiMBit + y2SIZEit + y3LOSSit + Y4Q4it + ysEA_LAGit 
+ y6DEALSIZEit (1) 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for an acquirer i at the earnings 
announcement for quarter t is continuously compounded over three days around the time 
of the earnings announcement (i.e., before, on, and after the announcement). The 
abnormal return is the acquirer's return, less the CRSP value-weighted market return. QT 
is an indicator variable equal to one if an acquirer i' s earnings announcement is for 
subsequent quarters after M&A, and zero if it is for the last quarter before M&A. UE is 
unexpected earnings for firm i at quarter t' s earnings announcement, scaled by the price 
at the end of the quarter of the earnings announcement. Expected earnings are measured 
as the last mean of the analysts' forecasts before the earnings announcement. Because 
previous literature supports a positive relationship between abnormal returns and 
unexpected earnings, the coefficient of UE is expected to be positive. 
The coefficient of the interaction term UE*QT represents whether there is a 
change in the ERC after M&A compared to the value before M&A. If investors believe 
that the financial reports of acquirers are not credible compared with reports prior to the 
M&A, there would be a decline in the ERC for firms after M&A. As such, the coefficient 
ofUE*QT is expected to be negative. If investors believe the fmancial reporting quality 
of acquirers following M&A improves over time, then the ERC for the acquirers in each 
of subsequent periods will be higher than in the immediately prior period. If so, the 
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coefficient ofUE*QT, which represents the ERC difference between the last quarter 
before M&A and each quarter following M&A, would be less negative. 
Finn characteristic variables are included to control for factors influencing the 
relationship between abnormal returns and unexpected earnings. The market to book 
value ratio (MB) is measured as of the end of the quarter for the earnings announcement. 
Collins and Kothari (1989) report a positive relationship between ERC and growth, so I 
predict that the coefficient of MB will be positive. SIZE, as the natural log of market 
value at the time of the earnings announcement, is included to control for other firm-level 
characteristics. A firm's size is related to various other firm characteristics, so I expect 
that the coefficient of SIZE will be either positive or negative. The indicator variable 
LOSS has a value of one if a firm reports a negative value in net income12 at the earnings 
announcement, and a value of zero otherwise. Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) and Haw 
et al. (2008) find that the firm's loss is the main cause of a decrease in association 
between abnormal returns and unexpected earnings, so I expect the coefficient of LOSS 
to be negative. The indicator variable Q4 has a value of one if the earnings announcement 
is for the fourth quarter of the firm's fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Salamon and Stober 
( 1994) document that information content of earnings at the fourth quarter is lower than 
other quarters. So, I expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative. 
Deal characteristic variables are also included as control variables. EA LAG is 
the number of days between M&A completion and the first earnings announcement 
following M&A. If an acquirer does not have enough time to prepare high-quality 
12 Net income after tax. 
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fmancial statements following M&A completion, investors may believe the quality of the 
firm's financial reporting is not as good after M&A. Therefore, the coefficient of this 
term is expected to be positiveY DEALSIZE is the ratio of the deal value to the market 
value of acquirer at the end of the quarter. A deal value that is too high may signal that 
the acquirer is paying too much compared to the target's market value, which may cause 
investors to react negatively to earnings after M&A. As such, I expect the coefficient of 
this term to be negative. 
To test whether firms acquiring foreign or private firms, and inter-industry 
acquirers experience greater declines in fmancial reporting quality than firms acquiring 
U.S. firms or public firms, and intra-industry acquirers after M&A, I use a regression 
model similar to the one in Model 1. The following regression is used for this test. 
CARit =at+ L~=l a 2,tQTit + U31NDi +L~=l a 4,tQTit * INDi+ PtUEit 
+ L~=l Pz,tUEit * QTit + PJUEit*INDi + L~=l P4,tUEit * QTit * INDi+ ControlSit+ Eit 
(2) 
UE and control variables are defined as in Model (1). In this model, IND is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one: (1) if a firm acquires another foreign firm [FOR], 
(2) if a firms acquirers another private firms [PRI], or (3) if an acquirer is an inter-
industry one [INT], and zero otherwise. If investors believe there is a decline in the 
13 In particular, acquirers completing an M&A transaction later in the fiscal year may face the 
need for integration with compliance, which may result in an incomplete consolidated financial 
statement. However, managing transaction timing is not easy, because acquirers may face a 
variety of market- and transaction-related situations. If managers of acquirers fmd they cannot 
conclude that disclosure procedures have been effective within a given time, they can report to 
the SEC that their financial statements and disclosure procedures are not yet effective since the 
targets have not been completely integrated into the acquirer. However, firms generally try to 
avoid reporting such ineffectiveness. In this study, the issue of integration with compliance may 
be insignificant in interim reports that do not require firms to have auditors' reports. 
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fmancial reporting quality offrrms with domestic, public targets or intra-industry 
acquirers, the sum of the coefficient ofUE and UE*QT would be less than the coefficient 
ofUE. Also, if investors believe there is a decline in the fmancial reporting quality of 
frrms acquiring foreign, private firms or inter-industry acquirers after M&A, the sum of 
the coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*IND and UE*QT*IND will be less than the sum of 
the coefficients ofUE and UE*IND. To compare the effect of each frrm characteristic 
over time, I examine whether the sum of the coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*IND and 
UE*QT*IND is less than the sum of the coefficients ofUE and UE*QT for each of eight 
subsequent quarters following M&A. 
Next, I examine whether agency-motivated acquirers have less fmancial reporting 
quality over time following M&A compared with synergy-motivated acquirers using a 
regression model, which is similar to the previous one (Model (2)). UE and other control 
variables are defmed as in Model (1). An indicator variable, AGN, is equal to one if 
acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns for three days around the M&A announcement 
are less than the median of the sample, and zero otherwise. 14 If investors believe agency-
motivated acquirers are more likely to misstate financial statements following M&A than 
synergy-motivated acquirers, then the sum ofthe coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*AGN 
and UE*QT* AGN would be less than the sum of the coefficients ofUE and UE*QT over 
14 There may be a similar management incentive to provide false information on financial 
statements. For firms with a positive evaluation (more than a median), investors may have high 
expectations for the M&A consolidation, and thus managers of such firms are more likely to 
misstate financial statements to satisfy investors' expectations. Alternatively, managers of firms 
with a negative evaluation (less than a median) are more incentivized to change investors' initial 
expectations about the M&A transaction and surprise investors by misstating information on 
fmancial statements. 
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time after M&A. Also, I compare the sum of each coefficient over the eight quarters 
following M&A. 
CARit =at+ L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3AGNi +L~=l a 4,tQTit * AGNi+ fhUEit + L~=t Pz,tUEit * 
QTit + fhUEit*AGNi + L~=t P4,tUEit * QTit * AGNi+ ControlSit+ Bit (3) 
4. 3. 2. Value Relevance of Earnings and Book Value 
The stock price of a firm is a function of its earnings and book value of equity 
(Ohlson 1995; Collins et al. 1997). Ifthe earnings and book value of a firm effectively 
explain the current stock price, then the financial information of the firm is believed to be 
informative with regard to the firm's value. I use the price-earnings model to examine 
and compare the R-squares of each quarter to determine whether information uncertainty 
caused by M&A decreases the value relevance of fmancial reporting for acquirers after 
M&A. The model is specified for the decline of the value relevance of earnings and book 
value as follows. 
(4) 
PRICE is the market price of a share of firm i three months after the end of 
quarter t, E is the net income per share of firm i during quarter t, and BV is the book 
value per share of firm i at the end of quarter t. The coefficient of E represents the effect 
of earnings in explaining the current market value of the acquirers, while the coefficient 
ofBV is the effect of book value on the market value of the acquirers. If the acquirers 
experience a decline in the value relevance of earnings due to M&A, then the coefficient 
of E at each regression will be reduced over time. However, as BV can also explain the 
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market price of a firm, and a decline in the value relevance of earnings is inversely 
related to an increase in the value relevance of the book value (Collins et al. 1997), I 
expect the coefficient of BV at each quarter to increase over time. I look at the R -square, 
the coefficients of determination from Model ( 4), to investigate whether the value 
relevance of financial reporting for the acquirers changes over time. The R -square 
represents the explanatory power of earnings and the book value of the acquirer. If an 
acquirer loses the value relevance of its fmancial reporting, then the R-square would 
decrease over time. So, I take the R-squares of a regression for each quarter from the last 
quarter before M&A (t=O) to the eighth quarter after M&A (t=8), and compare each to 
the others to investigate whether the value relevance of fmancial reporting for the 
acquirers reduces over time for the nine quarters. 
In order to compare the acquirers with domestic targets with firms acquiring 
foreign firms, I do a regression for each sample of acquirers with domestic versus foreign 
targets from the last quarter before M&A to the eighth quarter following M&A. If the 
decline in the value relevance of financial reporting for acquirers with foreign targets is 
greater than for firms acquiring domestic targets, then the R-squares for the post-M&A 
would be lower than the ones for the pre-M&A. Also, if the value relevance recovers in 
subsequent quarters following M&A, then the R-squares for firms with foreign targets 
would take a longer time to increase than for firms with domestic targets. Similarly, a 
regression for each sample of acquirers with public versus private targets, intra-industry 
versus inter-industry acquirers, and synergy-motivated versus agency-motivated acquirers 
provides the comparisons for the R-squares for each sample of acquirers. If M&A with 
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private targets, inter-industry acquirers and agency-motivated acquirers have less value 
relevance for fmancial reporting than firms with public targets, intra-industry acquirers 
and synergy-motivated acquirers following M&A, then the R-squares of a regression for 
quarters for the former sample group following M&A would be lower than those for the 
latter sample group, and it would take a longer time to let investors believe that the 
financial reporting quality of former sample group firms would recover over time. 
However, I acknowledge that simple comparisons at each R-square of each subsample 
cannot be statistically tested because I have only one observation ofR-squares for each 
subsample. So, once the value relevance declines immediately after M&A, I use the 
following model for each sub sample to investigate whether the declined R -squares 
increase over time after M&A (from t=l to t=O). 
R-square =Ill+ lhTIMEit + ~2INDit + P3TIME*INDit + Eit (5) 
TIME is quarters from t=l to t=8, and IND represents FOR, PRJ, and INT as 
defined before. TIME*IND shows the difference between each subsample. If the value 
relevance improves after M&A, I expect to the coefficient on TIME to be positive. Also, 
if the value relevance for acquirers with foreign or private targets or inter-industry 
acquires have slower recovery, then I would expect the coefficient on TIME*IND to be 
negative. 
R-square =Ill + P1TIMEit + ~2AGNit + P3TIME* AGNit + Eit (6) 
Similarly, in the Model (6), I examine whether investors have any differences in 
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the recovery of confidence on fmancial reporting quality between synergy-motivated and 
agency-motivated firms by comparing the R-squares of regressions with such firm 
subsamples. TIME is quarters from t= 1 to t=8, and AGN is same as defmed before. 
TIME* AGN shows the difference between synergy-motivated and agency-motivated 
acquirers. If the value relevance improves after M&A, I expect to the coefficient on 
TIME to be positive. Also, if the value relevance for acquirers with agency-motivated 
acquires have slower recovery, then I would expect the coefficient on TIME* AGN to be 
negative. 
Additionally, I test the value relevance of earnings for each subsample to examine 
how the earnings themselves are informative to investors following M&A. All variables 
are defined as before and models are similar to the previous Models (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
(7) 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l <Xz,tQTit + <I31NDi +L~=l a4,tQTit * INDi+ lhEit + L~=1 Pz,tEit * QTit 
+ lhEit*INDi + L~=1 P4,tEit * QTit * INDt+ YIBVit + Eit (8) 
PRICEit =<II+ L~=l <Xz,tQTit + <I3AGNi +L~=1 a4,tQTit * AGNi+ P1Eit + L~=1 Pz,tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit* AGNi + L~=1 P4,tEit * QTit * AGNi+ yJBVit + Eit (9) 
The coefficient of the interaction term E*QT represents whether there is a change 
in the value relevance of earnings after M&A compared to the value before M&A. If 
investors believe that the earnings of acquirers are not credible compared with earnings 
prior to the M&A, there would be a decline in the value relevance for firms after M&A. 
As such, the coefficient ofE*QT is expected to be negative. If investors believe the value 
relevance of earnings of acquirers following M&A improves over time, then the value 
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relevance of earnings for the acquirers in each of subsequent periods will be higher than 
in the immediately prior period. If so, the coefficient of E*QT, which represents the value 
relevance of earnings difference between the last quarter before M&A and each quarter 
following M&A, would be less negative. 
If investors believe there is a decline in the value relevance of earnings of firms 
with domestic, public targets or intra-industry acquirers, the sum ofthe coefficient ofE 
and E*QT would be less than the coefficient of E. Also, if investors believe there is a 
decline in the value relevance of earnings of firms acquiring foreign, private firms or 
inter-industry acquirers after M&A, the sum of the coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*IND and 
E*QT*IND will be less than the sum ofthe coefficients ofE and E*IND. To compare the 
effect of each firm characteristic over time, I examine whether the sum of the coefficients 
ofE, E*QT, E*IND and E*QT*IND is less than the sum of the coefficients ofE and 
E*QT for each of eight subsequent quarters following M&A. 
Finally, if investors believe agency-motivated acquirers are more likely to 
misstate financial statements following M&A than synergy-motivated acquirers, then the 
sum ofthe coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*AGN and E*QT*AGN would be less than the sum 
of the coefficients ofE and E*QT over time after M&A. Also, I compare the sum of each 
coefficient over the eight quarters following M&A. 
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5. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
5. 1. Sample Selection 
I identify completed M&A transactions from the M&A database of the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) from the beginning of 1991 to the end of2010. I select firms 
without specific transactions, such as repurchases, leveraged buyouts, exchange offers, 
spinoffs, recapitalizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, self-tenders, or 
privatizations. The acquirers in my sample are public firms because I require accounting, 
stock return, and analyst data for the acquirers. However, the targets include both public 
and private firms. While all of the acquirers are U.S. firms, the targets can be U.S. or 
foreign firms. I also require the acquirers to have less than 20% of the targets' shares 
before M&A but more than 50% after M&A. Removing firms with less than 20% of 
targets' shares before M&A from the sample enables my study to focus on the acquirers 
that do not have much information about the targets before M&A transactions. 15 The 
reason I only use firms that hold more than 50% of the targets' shares after M&A is so 
that the acquirers in my study are those that consolidate the fmancial statements of the 
targets following M&A. I delete additional M&A for acquirers that have more than one 
transaction in one quarter while compromising some characteristics of targets, so that 
each acquirer has one observation for each quarter. After this process of selection, I was 
left with a total of 38,141 quarters for both the ERC and the valuation for the acquirers. 
Since quarters with multiple M&A activities may have noise in interpreting the 
15 Although firms may own between 20% and 50% of a separate firm (significant ownership 
interests), ownership of large percentages indicates that a firm has some ability to affect the 
investee's decision-making processes. 
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effect ofM&A, I delete these quarters for my main analysis, but include them in 
additional analysis for a robustness test. M&A deal value should be significant enough to 
affect the fmancial reporting quality of the acquirers. However, for roughly half of the 
total M&A transactions in my sample, the deal value was not disclosed. In order to have 
significant effect of M&A, I delete quarters without disclosed deal value, and the deal 
value for the acquirers in each quarter was required to be at least 3% of the acquirers' 
market value for firms with disclosed deal value. To remove the consolidation effect of 
prior M&A, quarters with another M&A within two quarters before the M&A completion 
quarter were excluded. 16 I delete quarters with M&As that have more than 137 days 
between M&A completion and the first earnings announcement. 17 
The quarterly fmancial (and forecast) information of the acquirers is available 
from Compustat, from stock returns providing the CRSP Daily Stock price, and from 
returns files and analysts' estimates from 1/B/E/S for the ERC analysis. Only quarterly 
fmancial statement information and price data from Compustat were used for market 
valuation analysis. If the acquirers did not have relevant data both for the last quarter 
before M&A and the first quarter after M&A, I deleted those quarters for the ERC 
models, but I also deleted quarters without data for the first quarter after M&A for the 
value relevant models. To mitigate the effect of outliers in my analysis, I truncated CAR, 
UE, MB and DEALSIZE variables below the 1% or above the 99% level of the sample 
16 Acquirers with more frequent M&As may be able to transform accounting numbers of targets, 
and thus reduce the consolidation effect. So, due to removing these cases, this study may have 
selection bias. 
17 137 days are the maximum number of days for which firms are allowed to announce earnings 
after M&A completion. ((365 days/4 quarters)*l.5) 
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distribution. By applying this sample selection process, I was left with 5,706 quarters and 
3,610 unique firms for the ERC analysis and 9,207 quarters and 5,545 unique firms for 
the valuation analysis. Panel A of Table 1 provides more detailed information on the 
sample selection. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the yearly distribution for the sample from 1991 to 
2011. 18 The 1990s had the greatest U.S. waves (Moeller et al. (2005)), indicating that 
U.S. firms reached new records for M&A activity during the late 1990s. Starting in 1995, 
M&A transactions boomed, peaking in 1997 and 1998, while the number ofM&A in 
other years remained relatively constant. Panel C of Table 1 shows that M&A waves also 
occurred when similar industries were clustered (Andrade et al. 2001; Harford 2005). 
Since technology and regulatory exogenous shocks affect the common economic 
environments around firms, M&A may send waves from these shocks to certain 
industries. My sample also shows that industries involved in high technology and 
regulations had larger populations than other industries. For example, the electronics and 
computer equipment industry (SIC code 36), bank industry (SIC code 60), and business 
services industry (SIC code 73) account for 31.22% of my initial sample for the ERC and 
31.87% for the market valuation sample, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
18 Since my sample consists of M&A completed between 1991 and 2010, the first quarter after 
M&A completion may include quarters in 2011. 
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5. 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents various descriptive statistics concerning the variables in my 
multivariate analysis for pre- and post-M&A quarters (t=O and t=1) for the ERC and for 
the first quarter (t=1) for the valuation I use. For the ERC variables, the mean (median) 
values of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the pre- and post-M&A quarter are 
0.0008 (0.0004) and 0.0014 (0.0017), respectively. These are not significantly different 
from each other, which suggests that, on average, the acquirers do not have different 
market responses around earnings announcements before and after M&A. Negative 
unexpected earnings (UE) (mean UE=-0.0008) in the post-M&A quarter (t=1) show that 
the acquirers tended not to surpass expected earnings after M&A. However, the median 
UE is positive (=0.0002) in the post-M&A quarter (t=1) showing that the acquirers beat 
expected earnings after M&A. Decrease in both mean and median UE from the pre- to 
post-M&A suggests that the acquirers do not meet analysts' forecast after M&A, or 
analysts are not able to estimate after M&A as accurately as before M&A. The market to 
book ratio (MB) from the pre-M&A quarter is significantly reduced (mean=2.6448 and 
median=2.0645) in the post-M&A quarter. The mean (median) market value of the 
acquirers (SIZE) insignificantly (significantly) increases from pre-M&A to post-M&A 
(mean=2,633 and median=561). Since acquirers tend to report increased assets, the book 
value of the acquirers is also expected to increase. So, the much larger level of the 
increase in the book value than the level of the increase in market value from the pre-
M&A quarter to the post-M&A results in the reduced market to book ratio. In the pre-
M&A quarters, 16.07% ofthe acquirers reported losses (LOSS), while 25 .18% of the 
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acquirers did so in the post-M&A quarters. This may be because acquirers engage in 
greater expenditures such as restructuring charges. 
In Panel B of Table 2 the market valuation variables show that the mean values of 
price (PRICE) do not show significant differences between pre- and post-M&A quarters, 
suggesting market prices are not affected by M&A consolidation. Decreases in earnings 
and increases in book value, as shown in the ERC variables, indicate that the acquirers 
report lower net income than before by expensing M&A-related costs and having higher 
net assets by combining another entity. Panel C of Table 2 shows that the distribution of 
the subsample for the ERC and valuation. U.S. (private) targets account for about 87.82% 
(76.92%) of the total sample for the ERC, while acquirers with intra-industry targets 
represent 89.05% of my sample. In the valuation distribution ofthe subsample, U.S. 
(private) targets account for about 89.16% (79.16%) of the total sample, and acquirers 
with intra-industry targets comprise 84.87% of my sample. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
main variables for the sample for the ERC and the market valuation in the first quarter 
following M&A. As documented in prior literature, UE is positively correlated with CAR 
at the significance level of 0.01 based on two-tailed tests for both correlation coefficients. 
Both negative correlation coefficients at the significance level of0.01 based on two-tailed 
tests between UE and LOSS indicates that, in most cases, analysts do not forecast as well 
as they do profits. Both negative correlation coefficients at the significance level of0.01 
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based on two-tailed tests between MB and DEALSIZE shows that mature firms are 
typically involved in large M&A transactions. The Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients between LOSS and DEALSIZE are positive at the significance level of 0.01 
based on two-tailed tests. This suggests that when deal size is large, acquires typically 
report loss since they may have a large amount of restructuring charges. Meanwhile, both 
correlation coefficients between EA _LAG and Q4 are significantly positive at the level of 
0.01 based on two-tailed tests, suggesting that firms reporting annual financial statements 
take more time to announce their earnings following completion of M&A. Both negative 
correlation coefficients at the significance level ofO.Ol based on two-tailed tests between 
DEALSIZE and MB indicates that the market typically negatively values the M&A with 
a large deal value. Lastly, both positive correlation coefficients at the significance level 
of0.01 based on two-tailed tests between DEALSIZE and LOSS show that acquirers 
experiencing a large M&A deal report loss after M&A. 
With regard to the Pearson and Spearman correlation of market valuation 
variables, the firm price (PRICE), earnings (E) and book values (BV) of acquirers are 
positively correlated with each other at the significant level ofO.Ol based on two-tailed 
tests, as has been well documented in the literature. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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6. Multivariate Analysis 
6. 1. Decline of ERC and Valuation for Hypothesis 1 
Panel A ofTable 4 shows the results of the ERC analysis from the last quarter 
(t=O) before M&A to the eighth quarter (t=8) following M&A. The overall model is 
significant with an adjusted R-square of0.0342. The coefficient ofUE is significantly 
positive (P1=3.0236) at the level of0.01, and all the coefficients ofUE*QT for the eight 
quarters for the model (1) are significantly negative at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the 
coefficients on UE and UE*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive 
(PI+P2,1=2.1746, at the level of0.01), but significantly lower than the coefficient on UE 
(P1=3.0236, at the level of0.01). This suggests investors believe the fmancial reporting 
quality of acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients on UE and UE*QT in subsequent quarters is significantly positive at the 
level of 0. 01, but significantly lower than the coefficients on UE at the level of 0. 01. This 
indicates that investor does not recover their responsiveness to fmancial reporting of 
acquirers within eight quarters. The coefficient of SIZE is significantly negative ( -0.0008, 
at the level ofO.Ol), suggesting that investors negatively respond to large acquirers. Also, 
the coefficient of LOSS is significantly negative (-0.0063, at the level ofO.Ol), which 
also indicates that investors react negatively to firms with losses. The significantly 
positive coefficient ofQ4 (0.0018, at the level ofO.Ol) shows that investors react 
positively to firms' fourth quarter fmancial reports. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Panel B ofTable 4 shows the results of the combined value relevance of financial 
reporting of the acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted 
R-square of more than 0.4412 for the eight quarters. From the last quarter before M&A 
(t=O) to the first quarter after M&A (t=1), the R-square drops from 0.4674 to 0.4412, 
suggesting that the financial statements of the acquirers in the first quarter following 
M&A are less value relevant to investors compared to the previous fmancial statements. 19 
Note that the coefficient of earnings decreases while the coefficient of book value 
increases from time t=O to time t= 1, which is consistent with the results of Collins et al. 
(1997). So, since investors lose confidence in the earnings ofthe acquirers after M&A, to 
value the acquirers they switch their information source from earnings to book value. 
However, they believe the combined earnings and book value are less value relevant after 
M&A than those prior to M&A. After the first quarter following M&A, investors appear 
to recover their use of financial reporting to value acquirers. 
Panel C of Table shows the results of the regression of TIME on R-squares of 
each following quarter from t=1 to t=O. The coefficient of TIME (P1) in Model (5) is 
significantly positive (0.0063, significant at the level of 0.1 ), indicating that the combined 
value relevance of fmancial reporting for the acquirers increases over time. 
Panel D of Table 4 shows the results of the value relevance of earnings of the 
acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of 
0.4898. The coefficient ofE is significantly positive (P1=10.7697) at the level of0.01, 
and all the coefficients ofE*QT for the eight quarters for the model (7) is significantly 
19 The difference in the R-squares between t=O and t=l cannot be conflrmed statistically because 
there are only two observations for this comparison. 
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negative. The sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT in the first quarter after M&A is 
significantly positive (PI+Pz,I=5.4388, at the level ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than 
the coefficient onE (P1=10.7697, at the level ofO.Ol). This suggests investors believe the 
value relevance of earnings acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the 
sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT in subsequent quarters is significantly positive at 
the level ofO.Ol, and most ofthem become close to the coefficient onE, but still 
significantly lower than the coefficients on E. This indicates that investors almost recover 
their belief in value relevance of earnings of acquirers within eight quarters, but not to the 
level prior to M&A. 
6.2. Decline ofERC and valuation for Hypothesis 2a 
Table 5 reports the results of the ERC and value relevance of the acquirers with 
domestic and foreign targets. Panel A of Table 5 shows the change of the ERC ofthe 
acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of 
0.0352. The coefficient ofUE (P1=2.9787) is significantly positive at the level ofO.Ol, 
and all the coefficients ofUE*QT (Pz,t) for the eight quarters for the model (2) is 
significantly negative at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*QT 
in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive (PI+Pz,I=2.2019, at the level of 
0.01), but significantly lower than the coefficient on UE (P1=2.9787, at the level ofO.Ol). 
This suggests investors believe the fmancial reporting quality of acquirers with domestic 
targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients on UE 
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and UE*QT (Pt+Pz,t) in subsequent quarters is significantly positive at the level ofO.Ol, 
but significantly lower than the coefficients on UE (P1) at the level of 0.0 1. This indicates 
that investor does not recover their responsiveness to financial reporting of acquirers with 
domestic targets within eight quarters. 
The sum of the coefficients ofUE and UE*FOR is significantly positive (P1+ 
P3=3.3728) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum of the coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*FOR, 
and UE*QT*FOR (Pt+Pz,t P3+P4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (2) are 
significantly positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, 
UE*FOR, and UE*QT*FOR in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (Pt+Pz,I 
P3+p4,t=2.0103) than the sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*FOR (P1+ P3=3.3728) at 
the significance level of 0.05, suggesting that investors believe the financial reporting 
quality of acquirers with foreign targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the 
sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*FOR, and UE*QT*FOR in the first quarter 
after M&A is significantly lower (Pt+Pz,I P3+P4,t=2.0103) than the sum of the coefficients 
on UE and UE*QT (P1+ P2,1=2.2019) at the significance level of0.05. This indicates that 
investors believe the financial reporting quality of acquirers with foreign targets declines 
more than that of acquirers with domestic targets immediately following M&A. The sum 
of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*FOR, and UE*QT*FOR (Pt+Pz,t P3+P4,t) in most 
subsequent quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients of UE and 
UE*FOR (P1+ P3), suggesting that investors believe the fmancial reporting quality of 
acquirers with foreign targets do not improve within eight quarters. The sum of the 
coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*FOR, and UE*QT*FOR (Pt+Pz,t P3+P4,t) in most 
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subsequent quarters is significantly lower or higher than the sum of the coefficients of UE 
and UE*QT (~1+~2,t), indicating that it is unclear that investors believe the financial 
reporting quality of acquirers with foreign targets is lower than that of acquirers with 
domestic targets. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of the combined value relevance of financial 
reporting of the acquirers with domestic and foreign targets around M&A. Overall, the 
model is significant with an adjusted R-square of more than 0.4383 for acquirers with 
domestic targets and 0.4788 for acquirers with foreign targets, respectively for the eight 
quarters. From the last quarter before M&A (t=O) to the first quarter after M&A (t=l), the 
R-square drops from 0.4649 to 0.4383 (from 0.5061 to 0.4788), suggesting that the 
fmancial statements of the acquirers with domestic (foreign) targets in the first quarter 
following M&A are less value relevant to investors compared to the previous fmancial 
statements.20 After the first quarter following M&A, investors appear to recover their use 
of fmancial reporting to value acquirers both with domestic and foreign targets. 
Panel C of Table 5 shows the results ofthe regression of TIME on R-squares of 
each following quarter from t=l to t=8. The coefficient of TIME (~ 1 ) in Model (5) is 
significantly positive (0.0058, significant at the level of 0.05), indicating that the 
combined value relevance of financial reporting for the acquirers with domestic targets 
increases over time. The coefficient ofTIME*FOR (~3) in Model (5) is insignificantly 
20 The difference in the R-squares between t=O and t=l cannot be confirmed statistically because 
there are only two observations for this comparison. 
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positive (0.0038), indicating that there is no difference in the increase of the combined 
value relevance of fmancial reporting for the acquirers with domestic targets and foreign 
targets over the subsequent quarters. 
Panel D of Table 5 shows the results of the value relevance of earnings of the 
acquirers with domestic and foreign targets around M&A. Overall, the model is 
significant with an adjusted R-square of0.4909. The coefficient ofE is significantly 
positive (~1=10.5946) at the level ofO.Ol, and all the coefficients ofE*QT for the eight 
quarters for the model (8) is significantly negative. The sum of the coefficients onE and 
E*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive (~1+~2,1=5.2094, at the level 
ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than the coefficient onE (~ 1=10.5946, at the level of 
0.01). This suggests investors believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with 
domestic targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients 
onE and E*QT in subsequent quarters is significantly positive at the level ofO.Ol, and all 
of them becomes close to the coefficient on E, but still significantly lower than the 
coefficients on E. This indicates that investors almost recover their belief in value 
relevance of earnings of acquirers with domestic within eight quarters, but not to the level 
prior to M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients ofE and E*FOR is significantly positive (~ 1+ 
~3=11.8140) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum of the coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*FOR, and 
E*QT*FOR (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (8) are significantly 
positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum ofthe coefficients onE, E*QT, E*FOR, and 
E*QT*FOR in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (~1+~2,1 ~3+~4,1=6.8688) 
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than the sum of the coefficients onE and E*FOR (~ 1+ ~3=11.8140) at the significance 
level of 0. 01, suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of 
acquirers with foreign targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*FOR, and E*QT*FOR in the first quarter after M&A is 
significantly higher (~1+~2, 1 ~3+~4,1=6.8688) than the sum ofthe coefficients onE and 
E*QT (~ 1+ ~2. 1 =5.2094) at the significance level of0.05. This indicates that investors 
believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with foreign targets declines less than 
that of acquirers with domestic targets immediately following M&A. The sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*FOR, and E*QT*FOR (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most subsequent 
quarters is not significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients ofE and E*FOR (~ 1+ 
~3), suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with 
foreign targets improve within eight quarters. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, 
E*FOR, and E*QT*FOR (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most subsequent quarters is significantly 
higher than the sum of the coefficients ofE and E*QT (~1+~2,t) , indicating that investors 
believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with foreign targets improves faster 
than that of acquirers with domestic targets. 
6.2. Decline ofERC and valuation for Hypothesis 2b 
Table 6 reports the results of the ERC and value relevance of the acquirers with 
public and private targets. Panel A of Table 6 shows the change ofthe ERC of the 
acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of 
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0.0344. The coefficient ofUE is significantly positive (~1=3.0387) at the level of 0.01, 
and most of the coefficients ofUE*QT (~2,t) for subsequent quarters for the model (2) is 
significantly negative except for the third quarter. The sum of the coefficients on UE and 
UE*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive (~1+~2,1=1.1507, at the 
level of0.01), but significantly lower than the coefficient on UE (~ 1=3.0387, at the level 
of 0. 01 ). This suggests investors believe the financial reporting quality of acquirers with 
public targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients on 
UE and UE*QT (~1+~2,t) in subsequent quarters is significantly positive at the level of 
0.01, but significantly lower than the coefficients on UE (~1 ) in subsequent quarters 
except in the third quarter. This indicates that investors seem to recover their 
responsiveness to fmancial reporting of acquirers with public targets within three 
quarters, but show lower responsiveness afterwards than before M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients ofUE and UE*PRI is significantly positive (~ 1+ 
~3=3.0167) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum ofthe coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*PRI, 
and UE*QT*PRI (~1+~z,t ~3+~4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (2) are significantly 
positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*PRI, and 
UE*QT*PRI in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (~1+~2,1 
~3+~4,1=2.4481) than the sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*PRI (~1+ ~3=3.0167) at 
the significance level of 0. 01, suggesting that investors believe the financial reporting 
quality of acquirers with private targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the 
sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*PRI, and UE*QT*PRI in the first quarter 
after M&A is significantly higher (~1+~2,1 ~3+~4,1=2.4481) than the sum of the 
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coefficients on UE and UE*QT (~ 1+ ~21=1.1507) at the significance level ofO.Ol. This 
' 
indicates that investors believe the fmancial reporting quality of acquirers with private 
targets declines less than that of acquirers with public targets immediately following 
M&A, which is opposite to my expectation. I posit that the consolidation of private 
targets though M&A transaction provides a signal about the resolution of information 
uncertainty of private targets. The information released about public firms consolidating 
with a target also includes information about the target, which may lead investors to 
believe information uncertainty is reduced. However, if the resolution effect is 
eliminated, information uncertainty related to the private target would lead to a decline in 
fmancial reporting quality over time. So, my results indicate that investors have less 
concerned about financial reporting quality of acquirers with private targets than that of 
acquirers with public targets immediately after M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*PRI, and UE*QT*PRI (~1+~2,t 
~3+~4,t) in most subsequent quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients 
ofUE and UE*PRI (~ 1+ ~3), suggesting that investors believe the financial reporting 
quality of acquirers with private targets do not improve within eight quarters. The sum of 
the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*PRI, and UE*QT*PRI (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most 
subsequent quarters is not significantly lower or higher than the sum of the coefficients of 
UE and UE*QT (~1+~2,t), indicating that investors believe the fmancial reporting quality 
of acquirers with private targets is not different from that of acquirers with public targets. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Panel B of Table 6 shows the results ofthe combined value relevance offmancial 
reporting of the acquirers with public and private targets around M&A. Overall, the 
model is significant with an adjusted R-square of more than 0.4441 for acquirers with 
public targets and 0.4240 for acquirers with private targets, respectively for the· eight 
quarters. From the last quarter before M&A (t=O) to the first quarter after M&A (t=1), the 
R-square drops from 0.4670 to 0.4441 (from 0.4461 to 0.4240), suggesting that the 
financial statements of the acquirers with public (private) targets in the first quarter 
following M&A are less value relevant to investors compared to the previous financial 
statements. After the first quarter following M&A, investors appear to recover their use 
of fmancial reporting to value acquirers both with public and private targets. 
Panel C of Table 6 shows the results ofthe regression of TIME on R-squares of 
each following quarter from t=1 to t=8. The coefficient of TIME (P1) in Model (5) is 
significantly positive (0.0058, significant at the level of 0.5), indicating that the combined 
value relevance of financial reporting .for the acquirers with public targets increases over 
time. The coefficient of TIME*PRI (P3) in Model (5) is insignificantly positive (0.0002), 
indicating that there is no difference in the increase of the combined value relevance of 
financial reporting for the acquirers with public targets and private targets over the 
subsequent quarters. 
Panel D of Table 6 shows the results of the value relevance of earnings of the 
acquirers with public and private targets around M&A. Overall, the model is significant 
with an adjusted R-square of 0.4936. The coefficient of E is significantly positive 
(P1=11.1001) at the level of 0.01, and only the coefficients ofE*QT for the first quarter 
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(B2,1=-6.7461) for the model (8) is significantly negative. The sum of the coefficients on 
E and E*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive (BI+B2,I=4.3540, at 
the level ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than the coefficient onE (B1=11.1001, at the 
level ofO.Ol). This suggests investors believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers 
with public targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients onE and E*QT in subsequent seven quarters is significantly positive at the 
level ofO.Ol , and all ofthem becomes close to the coefficient onE, and are not 
significantly different from the coefficients on E. This indicates that investors recover 
their belief in value relevance of earnings of acquirers with public within eight quarters to 
the level prior to M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients ofE and E*PRI is significantly positive (B1+ 
B3=10.4126) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum of the coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*PRI, and 
E*QT*PRI (B1+B2,t B3+B4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (8) are significantly 
positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, E*PRI, and 
E*QT*PRI in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (B1+B2,1 B3+B4,I=5.9184) 
than the sum of the coefficients onE and E*PRI (B1+ B3=10.4126) at the significance 
level of 0. 01, suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of 
acquirers with private targets declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*PRI, and E*QT*PRI in the first quarter after M&A is 
significantly higher (B1+B2,1 B3+B4,I=5.9184) than the sum of the coefficients onE and 
E*QT (B1+ B2,1=4.3540) at the significance level ofO.Ol. This indicates that investors 
believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with private targets declines less than 
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that of acquirers with public targets immediately following M&A. The sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*PRI, and E*QT*PRI (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most subsequent 
quarters is not significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients ofE and E*PRI (~ 1+ 
~3), suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with 
private targets improve in subsequent quarters. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, 
E*PRI, and E*QT*PRI (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most subsequent quarters is not significantly 
different from the sum of the coefficients ofE and E*QT (~I+~z,t), indicating that 
investors believe the value relevance of earnings of acquirers with private targets is not 
different in improvement from that of acquirers with public targets. 
6.2. Decline of ERC and valuation for Hypothesis 2c 
Table 7 reports the results of the ERC and value relevance ofthe intra- and inter-
industry acquirers. Panel A of Table 7 shows the change of the ERC of the acquirers 
around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of0.0345. The 
coefficient ofUE is significantly positive (~ 1=3.0558) at the level ofO.Ol, and most of 
the coefficients ofUE*QT (~z,t) for subsequent quarters for the model (2) is significantly 
negative. The sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*QT in the first quarter after M&A is 
significantly positive (~I+~z,I=2.1253, at the level ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than 
the coefficient on UE (~1=3.0558, at the level ofO.Ol). This suggests investors believe 
the fmancial reporting quality of intra-industry acquirers declines immediately following 
M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*QT (~I+~z,t) in subsequent 
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quarters is significantly positive at the level of 0.01, but significantly lower than the 
coefficients on UE (~ 1 ) in subsequent quarters. This indicates that investors do not 
recover their responsiveness to fmancial reporting of intra-industry acquirers within eight 
quarters following M&A. 
The sum ofthe coefficients ofUE and UE*INT is significantly positive (~ 1+ 
~3=2.8427) at the level of 0.01. All the sum of the coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*INT, 
and UE*QT*INT (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (2) are significantly 
positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*INT, and 
UE*QT*INT in the first quarter after M&A is not significantly lower (~1+~2,1 
~3+~4,1=2.6843) than the sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*INT (~1+ ~3=2.8427), 
suggesting that investors believe the fmancial reporting quality of inter-industry 
acquirers does not decline immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients 
on UE, UE*QT, UE*INT, and UE*QT*INT (~1+~2,1 ~3+~4,1=2.6843) in the first quarter 
after M&A is not significantly different from the sum of the coefficients on UE and 
UE*QT (~ 1+ ~2, 1=2.1253). This indicates thatinvestors believe the financial reporting 
quality of inter-industry acquirers declines less than that of intra-industry acquirers 
immediately following M&A. Two results of inter-industry acquirers immediately 
following M&A is inconsistent with my expectation. I posit that the consolidation of a 
target in a different industry though M&A transaction provides a signal that the acquirer 
seeks operational efficiency despite taking a risk of difficulties in operation and reporting 
coming from a different industry. If investors believe that the acquirer has a good 
intention for M&A (like synergy-motivated M&A), then they would credit more on the 
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quality in financial statements. So, my results show that investors have less concerned 
about fmancial reporting quality of inter-industry acquirers than that of intra-industry 
acquirers immediately after M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*INT, and UE*QT*INT (J31+J32,t 
J33+J34,t) in most subsequent quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients 
ofUE and UE*INT (J31+ J33), suggesting that investors believe the fmancial reporting 
quality of intra-industry acquirers do not improve within eight quarters. The sum of the 
coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*INT, and UE*QT*INT (J3t+J32,t J33+[34,t) in most 
subsequent quarters is not significantly different from the sum of the coefficients ofUE 
and UE*INT (J3t+J32,t), indicating that it is unclear that investors believe the fmancial 
reporting quality of inter-industry acquirers is not different from that of intra-industry 
acqmrers. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results of the combined value relevance of fmancial 
reporting of the intra- and inter-industry acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is 
significant with an adjusted R-square of more than 0.4432 for intra-industry acquirers and 
0.4465 for inter-industry acquirers, respectively for the eight quarters. From the last 
quarter before M&A (t=O) to the first quarter after M&A (t=l), the R-square drops from 
0.4640 to 0.4432 (from 0.4897 to 0.4465), suggesting that the fmancial statements of the 
intra-industry (inter-industry) acquirers in the first quarter following M&A are less value 
relevant to investors compared to the previous financial statements. After the first quarter 
58 
following M&A, investors appear to recover their use of fmancial reporting to value both 
intra- and inter-industry acquirers. 
Panel C of Table 7 shows the results ofthe regression of TIME on R-squares of 
each following quarter from t=l to t=8. The coefficient of TIME (P1) in Model (5) is 
significantly positive (0.0065, significant at the level of 0.1 ), indicating that the combined 
value relevance of fmancial reporting for the intra- and inter-industry acquirers increases 
over time. The coefficient of TIME *INT (P3) in Model ( 5) is insignificantly negative (-
0.0005), indicating that there is no difference in the increase of the combined value 
relevance of fmancial reporting for the intra- and inter-acquirers with public over the 
subsequent quarters. 
Panel D of Table 7 shows the results of the value relevance of earnings of the 
intra- and inter-industry acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is significant with an 
adjusted R-squa:re of0.4957. The coefficient ofE is significantly positive (P1=10.7640) at 
the level ofO.Ol, and some of the coefficients ofE*QT for subsequent quarters for the 
model (8) is significantly negative. The sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT in the 
first quarter after M&A is significantly positive (PI+P2,1=5.5588, at the level ofO.Ol), but 
significantly lower than the coefficient onE (P1=10.7640, at the level ofO.Ol). This 
suggests investors believe the value relevance of earnings of intra-industry acquirers 
declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT 
in subsequent seven quarters is significantly positive at the level ofO.Ol, and some of 
them becomes close to the coefficient onE (they are not significantly different from 
zero), and others are not significantly different from the coefficients on E. This indicates 
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that investors recover their belief in value relevance of earnings of intra-industry 
acquirers within eight quarters to the level prior to M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients ofE and E*INT is significantly positive (~I+ 
~3=8 .0638) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum of the coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*INT, and 
E*QT*INT (~I+~2,t ~3+~4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (8) are significantly 
positive at the level ofO.Ol. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, E*INT, and 
E*QT*INT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (~I+~2, I ~3+~4,I=3.3498) 
than the sum of the coefficients onE and E*INT (~I+ ~3=8.0638) at the significance level 
ofO.Ol, suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of inter-industry 
acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the coefficients on E, 
E*QT, E*INT, and E*QT*INT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower 
(~I+~2, I ~3+~4,I=3.3498) than the sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT (~ I+ 
~2,I=5 .5588) at the significance level ofO.Ol. Since the coefficient ofE (~3=-2.7002) is 
significantly different from zero, and the lower sum of the coefficients ofE, E*QT, 
E*INT, and E*QT*INT (~I+~2,I ~3+~4,I=3.3498) at the first quarter after M&A comes 
from the coefficient ofE (~3=-2.7002), I compare ratios of ~I I (~I+~2) with (~I+~3) I 
(~I+~2,I ~3+~4,I) . . The ratios of the decline of the value relevance of earnings are 10.7640 I 
5.5588 = 1.9364 and 8.0638 I 3.3498 = 2.4072, respectively.2I This indicates that 
investors believe the value relevance of earnings of inter-industry acquirers declines more 
than that of intra-industry acquirers immediately following M&A. The sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*INT, and E*QT*INT (~I+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in most subsequent 
21 Lower ratio means lower decline of the value relevance of earnings. 
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quarters is not significantly lower than the sum ofthe coefficients ofE and E*INT (P1+ 
P3), suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of inter-industry 
acquirers improve in subsequent quarters. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, 
E*INT, and E*QT*INT CP1+P2,t P3+P4,t) in most subsequent quarters is significantly 
lower than the sum of the coefficients ofE and E*QT (P1+P2,t), and the ratios of P1 1 
(P1+P2,J are still lower than (P1+P3) I {P1+P2,t P3+P4,t) in subsequent quarters, indicating 
that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of inter-industry acquirers is still 
lower than that of intra-industry acquirers. 
6.3. Decline ofERC and valuation for Hypothesis 3 
Table 8 reports the results of the ERC and value relevance ofthe synergy-
motivated and agency-motivated acquirers. Panel A of Table 8 shows the change of the 
ERC of the synergy-motivated and agency-motivated acquirers around M&A. Overall, 
the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of0.0369. The coefficient ofUE is 
significantly positive (P1=3.4669) at the level ofO.Ol, and most of the coefficients of 
UE*QT CP2,t) for subsequent quarters for the model (2) is significantly negative. The sum 
of the coefficients on UE and UE*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly 
positive (PI+P2,1=2.4406, at the level ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than the coefficient 
on UE (P1=3.4669, at the level ofO.Ol). This suggests investors believe the fmancial 
reporting quality of synergy-motivated acquirers declines immediately following M&A. 
Also, the sum of the coefficients on UE and UE*QT CP1+P2,t) in subsequent quarters is 
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significantly positive at the level of 0.01 , but significantly lower than the coefficients on 
UE (P1) in subsequent quarters. This indicates that investors do not recover their 
responsiveness to financial reporting of synergy-motivated acquirers within eight quarters 
following M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients ofUE and UE* AGN is significantly positive (P1+ 
P3=3.0345) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum ofthe coefficients ofUE, UE*QT, UE*AGN, 
and UE*QT* AGN (Pt+P2,t P3+p4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (2) are 
significantly positive at the level of 0.01. The sum of the coefficients on UE, UE*QT, 
UE* AGN, and UE*QT* AGN in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower 
(Pt+P2,I P3+P4,t=2.0449) than the sum ofthe coefficients on UE and UE*AGN (P1+ 
P3=3.0345), suggesting that investors believe the financial reporting quality of agency-
motivated acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE* AGN, and UE*QT* AGN (Pt+P2,t P3+p4,t=2.0449) in 
the frrst quarter after M&A is not significantly different from the sum of the coefficients 
on UE and UE*QT (P1+ P2,1=2.4406). This indicates that investors believe the financial 
reporting quality of agency-motivated acquirers is not different in decrease immediately 
following M&A from that of synergy-motivated acquirers. This is inconsistent with my 
expectation. I posit that investors may not need to punish the agency-motivated acquirers 
after M&A because they already did on M&A announcements. Even if there are 
misstatements of financial reporting of agency-motivated acquirers after M&A, investors 
may already put their expectations in response to financial reporting. Then, investors 
would credit more or less on the quality in financial statements of agency-motivated 
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acquirers than that of synergy-motivated acquirers. So, my results show that investors 
show no difference in their response to fmancial reporting between synergy-motivated 
and agency-motivated acquirers immediately after M&A. 
The sum ofthe coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*AGN, and UE*QT*AGN 
(P1+P2,t P3+P4,t) in most subsequent quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the 
coefficients ofUE and UE* AGN (P1+ P3), suggesting that investors believe the financial 
reporting quality of agency-motivated acquirers do not improve within eight quarters. 
The sum ofthe coefficients on UE, UE*QT, UE*AGN, and UE*QT*AGN (p1+P2,t 
P3+p4,t) in most subsequent quarters is not significantly different from the sum of the 
coefficients ofUE and UE* AGN (PI+P2,t), indicating that investors believe the financial 
reporting quality of agency-motivated acquirers is not different from that of synergy-
motivated acquirers. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Panel B of Table 8 shows the results of the combined value relevance of fmancial 
reporting of the synergy-motivated and agency-motivated acquirers around M&A. 
Overall, the model is significant with an adjusted R-square of more than 0.4202 for 
synergy-motivated acquirers and 0.4508 for agency-motivated acquirers, respectively for 
the eight quarters. From the last quarter before M&A (t=O) to the first quarter after M&A 
(t=l), the R-square drops from 0.4541 to 0.4202 (from 0.4779 to 0.4508), suggesting that 
the financial statements ofthe synergy-motivated (agency-motivated) acquirers in the 
first quarter following M&A are less value relevant to investors compared to the previous 
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financial statements. After the first quarter following M&A, investors appear to recover 
their use of fmancial reporting to value synergy-motivated and agency-motivated 
acquirers. 
Panel C of Table 8 shows the results ofthe regression of TIME on R-squares of 
each following quarter from t=1 to t=8. The coefficient of TIME (~ 1) in Model (5) is 
significantly positive (0.0064, significant at the level of 0.1 ), indicating that the combined 
value relevance of fmancial reporting for the synergy-motivated and agency-motivated 
acquirers increases over time. The coefficient of TIME* AGN (~3) in Model ( 5) is 
insignificantly negative ( -0.00022), indicating that there is no difference in the increase of 
the combined value relevance of fmancial reporting for the synergy-motivated and 
agency-motivated acquirers with public over the subsequent quarters. 
Panel D of Table 8 shows the results of the value relevance of earnings of the 
synergy-motivated and agency-motivated acquirers around M&A. Overall, the model is 
significant with an adjusted R-square of0.4842. The coefficient ofE is significantly 
positive (~ 1=11.4187) at the level of0.01, and some ofthe coefficients ofE*QT for 
subsequent quarters for the model (8) is significantly negative. The sum of the 
coefficients onE and E*QT in the first quarter after M&A is significantly positive 
(~1+~z,1=6.3408, at the level ofO.Ol), but significantly lower than the coefficient onE 
(~ 1=11.4187, at the level of0.01). This suggests investors believe the value relevance of 
earnings of synergy-motivated acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the 
sum of the coefficients onE and E*QT in subsequent seven quarters is significantly 
positive at the level of0.01, but most are not significantly different from the coefficients 
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on E. This indicates that investors recover their belief in value relevance of earnings of 
synergy-motivated acquirers in subsequent quarters to the level prior to M&A. 
The sum of the coefficients of E and E * AGN is significantly positive (~ 1 + 
~3=10.4410) at the level ofO.Ol. All the sum ofthe coefficients ofE, E*QT, E*AGN, and 
E*QT* AGN (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) for the eight quarters for the model (8) are significantly 
positive at the level of0.01. The sum of the coefficients onE, E*QT, E* AGN, and 
E*QT*AGN in the first quarter after M&A is significantly lower (~1+~2,1 ~3+~4,1=4.5817) 
than the sum ofthe coefficients onE and E*AGN (~ 1+ ~3=10.4410) at the significance 
level of 0. 01, suggesting that investors believe the value relevance of earnings of agency-
motivated acquirers declines immediately following M&A. Also, the sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E* AGN, and E*QT* AGN in the first quarter after M&A is 
significantly lower (~1+~2,1 ~3+~4,1=4.5817) than the sum of the coefficients onE and 
E*QT (~ 1+ ~2. 1=6.3408) at the significance level ofO.Ol. This indicates that investors 
believe the value relevance of earnings of agency-motivated acquirers declines more than 
that of synergy-motivated acquirers immediately following M&A. The sum of the 
coefficients onE, E*QT, E*AGN, and E*QT*AGN (~1+~2,t ~3+~4,t) in some subsequent 
quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients ofE and E* AGN (~ 1+ ~3), 
but not in others, suggesting that it is unclear whether investors believe the value 
relevance of earnings of synergy-motivated acquirers improve in subsequent quarters. 
The sum ofthe coefficients onE, E*QT, E*AGN, and E*QT*AGN (~1+lht J33+J34,t) in 
most subsequent quarters is significantly lower than the sum of the coefficients ofE and 
E*QT (~1+~2,t), in subsequent quarters, indicating that investors believe the value 
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relevance of earnings of agency-motivated acquirers is still lower than that of synergy-
motivated acquirers. 
6. 4. Comparison between ERC and Value Relevance 
The multivariate results of the ERC and value relevance of financial reporting 
generally show reduced measures immediately after M&A. However, the ERC results 
suggest that investors continue to lose confidence in firms engaging in M&A activities, 
while the valuation results suggest that financial statements of the acquirers are believed 
to be value relevant in periods following M&A. For example, the ERC results reveal that 
all acquirers show a relatively consistent decline (all of the ERCs of subsequent periods 
are significantly lower than that of the pre-M&A at the significance level ofO.Ol). While 
there is a decline in the value relevance in the quarter immediately following the M&A, 
there appears to be a recovery of the value relevance in the following seven quarters. In 
subsample tests, the ERC results of acquirers with foreign targets in subsequent periods 
are significantly lower than those of the pre-M&A while the value relevance of earnings 
show that acquires with foreign targets almost recover their value relevance of earnings 
in subsequent quarters. Similarly, the ERC results of acquirers with private targets in 
subsequent periods are significantly lower than those of the pre-M&A while the value 
relevance of earnings show that acquires with private targets almost recover their value 
relevance of earnings in subsequent quarters. 
First, the difference may come from the different measurement windows. The 
ERC measures are based on the short window around earnings announcements (three 
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days in this study). So, investors may not fully obtain information in those time periods, 
and analysts' forecasts are not available to affect investors within this short time. M&A 
information flows during the three days around earnings announcements, and information 
uncertainty as well as management motivation for M&A may mingle within these short 
periods. Therefore, when investors have new information at earnings announcements in 
quarters following M&A, they may not be sure it is related to the M&A within the short 
time windows. However, the valuation model that I use in this study measures stock price 
three months after the quart end. So, investors have more time to understand and analyze 
the fmancial reporting in estimating the valuation parameters. Therefore, even though the 
investors appear to show a low response to information that just arrived after a structural 
and operational change (Brav and Heaton 2002), they will alter their estimates of 
valuation once they have enough information about the M&A with a relatively long time 
to investigate, compared to the short ERC windows. Second, the difference may result 
from the use of analysts' forecasts as expectations of earnings to compute the unexpected 
earnings measure. Note that in the ERC analysis, we have expectations about each 
financial reporting of acquirers. The analysts may tend to optimistically forecast earnings 
since they expect a synergy effect from the M&A, and investors may not react to the 
unexpected earnings due high expectations. Thus, the ERC may not recover within the 
next couple of quarters. In contrast, there is no expectation of financial reporting of 
acquirers in valuation model since the stock price is measured three months after the 
quarter end, which is not related to earnings report around that time. 
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7. Additional Analyses 
7 .1. ERC and Value Relevance of Earnings with 1% and 5% of Relative Deal Size 
The effect of M&A on the fmancial reporting quality is expected to depend on 
deal size ofM&A included in each quarter. So, to ensure that the results of the ERC and 
value relevance are robust with different deal size of M&A, I test above regression 
models with 1% and 5% cut off of relative deal size, which is deal value over the market 
value of acquirers. 22 Table 9 show the results of change of the ERC and valuation with 
1% and 5% relative deal size. In Panel A of Table 9, the ERC results oftotal42,305 and 
36,863 of number of quarters for 1% and 5% of relative deal size, respectively, show that 
investors consider the quality of financial reporting of acquirers to decrease immediately 
after M&A, and keep their perceptions of the low financial reporting quality over time. In 
Panel B of Table 9, the results of value relevance of earnings also report investors' low 
confidence in the quality of fmancial reporting after M&A, and appear to recover over 
time. 
Table 10 show the results of the ERC and value relevance of earnings for 
acquirers with domestic and foreign targets with 1% and 5% of relative deal size. The 
ERC results with 5% of relative deal size and value relevance results with both 1% and 
5% of relative deal size indicate that investors believe acquirers with foreign targets 
experience greater decline of the financial reporting quality than acquirers with domestic 
targets immediately after M&A, which is similar to the main results in Table 5. Table 11 
22 I also did 10% of relative deal size. The results are qualitatively similar with the main results 
for the sample model (1), However, the number of observations is very small for some of the 
subsample analyses. 
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represents the results of the ERC and value relevance of earnings for acquirers with 
public and private targets with 1% and 5% of relative deal size. Those results are similar 
to the main results with 3% of relative deal size in Table 6. The results of the ERC and 
value relevance of earnings for acquirers with intra- and inter-industry targets with 5% of 
relative deal size in Table 12 show stronger support to hypothesis 2c than the results with 
1% and 3% of relative deal size. Specifically, the coefficients of inter-industry targets are 
significantly lower after M&A than those before M&A (from 2.4096 to 1.2123 for ERC 
and from 6.8391 to 2.7607 for valuation, respectively). Lastly, the results of Table 13 are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. 
7.2. ERC and Value Relevance of Earnings with Extended Sample 
For roughly half of the total M&A transactions in my sample, deal value was not 
disclosed. To include effect of M&A of the undisclosed M&A, and increase the 
generality of this study, I extend sample size by using the total assets difference between 
the pre- and post- M&A for the undisclosed M&A. The deal value that the acquirers dealt 
with in each quarter was required to be at least 3% of the market value of the acquirers 
for disclosed deal value firms and at least 5% of the total asset difference between the last 
quarter before M&A and the first quarter after M&A for undisclosed deal value firms. 23 
In cases of multiple M&A (i.e., one acquirer and more than one target per quarter), the 
23 In the sample of disclosed transaction value firms, 83% of undisclosed flrms with more than 
5% of total asset difference were included in a sample offlrms with 3% of the market value of 
acquiring flrms, showing a significant difference in inclusion of firms with more than 5% total 
asset difference between less than 3% and more than 3% of market value. As such, I assume that 
a 5% cutoff of total asset difference is reasonable for significant M&A transactions for 
undisclosed transaction value flrms. 
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acquirers may disclose all transactions, some of them, or none. If they disclose all 
transactions, then I take the quarter to be disclosed. If they disclose only some of the 
transactions or none of them, then I take the quarter to be an undisclosed quarter. In cases 
of multiple M&A, not all characteristics of targets are identical. For example, some 
targets are private while others are public for the same acquirer in the same quarter. In 
such cases, I delete the quarter with the multiple M&A activities. The full sample was 
formed after three different steps were taken. First, one sample group consists of quarters 
with a single M&A following M&A. Second, another sample group was created for 
quarters with multiple M&A after M&A, either with all public or private targets or with 
all U.S. or foreign targets. Third, I merged the samples created through the first and 
second steps. The full sample then consisted of quarters with a single M&A or multiple 
M&A where all target firms were of the same nationality or public status. 
Table 14 through 18 presents the results ofthe ERC and the value relevance of 
earnings for the full sample, using 3% of market value for disclosed M&A and 5% of 
total asset difference between the pre- and post-M&A for undisclosed M&A. The full 
sample includes 62,070 observations for the sample ERC analysis and 121,290 
observations for the sample value relevance of earnings analysis. The results of the ERC 
and the value relevance of earnings are qualitatively similar with the main results in this 
study. Both the ERC and the value relevance of earnings show that immediate decline of 
the measures occur following M&A compared to the pre-M&A, indicating that investors 
have less confidence in financial reporting of acquirers following M&A than that before 
M&A. The consistently lower ERC results than the pre-M&A one in subsequent quarters 
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show that investors do not recover their belief in financial reporting of acquirers while the 
almost recovered value relevance of earnings (in spite of statistically different from the 
pre-M&A level) suggests that investors consider the earnings of acquirers in subsequent 
quarters to be similarly value relevant with that before M&A. 
Finally, I also did robust test by using clustering standard errors by firm. The 
significance level of each interested coefficients and sum of coefficients changes slightly, 
but the results are similar to the main results in this study. 
7 .2. Caveats 
The test for the value relevance of earnings and book value is statistically weak. 
To compare the value relevance of earnings and book value between the pre- and post-
M&A, I just use two R-squares to see whether the number after M&A is lower than that 
before M&A. Even though the number drops down, the interpretation comes from a 
simple eyeballing. Also, I examine whether the R-squares in subsequent quarters recover 
by looking at the 8 observations. This small number of observations may lead to a biased 
result. 
The correlation matrix shown in Table 3 indicates that the negative net income of 
acquirers are significantly related to cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected 
earnings, which are dependent and interested independent variables in the ERC analysis. 
Since M&A involves large non-recurring costs such as restructuring costs, acquirers tend 
to report negative income immediately after M&A as shown in Table 2. Investors do not 
expect extreme earnings change by such temporary expenses to be permanent. So, low 
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earnings response coefficients after M&A may be driven by negative net income (Ryan 
1995). That is why I use LOSS as an indicator variable to control for the effect of 
negative net income in the ERC models. Also, it may be possible there is no difference in 
the decline of fmancial reporting quality between subsamples, indicating that investors do 
not differentiate the quality in financial statements if acquirers report negative income. 
This means that the effect of negative income may be dominant over other effects such as 
information uncertainty and management motivation for M&A. The future research 
includes examination of the effect of negative net income on investor responsiveness and 
valuation. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether fmancial reporting quality of acquirers declines 
after M&A and how the decline of fmancial reporting quality changes over time. I fmd 
that firms acquiring other firms experience a decrease in the ERC and value relevance of 
financial information immediately after M&A, indicating that investors believe M&A 
decreases the fmancial reporting quality of acquirers. The decline in the value relevance 
in the quarter immediately after an M&A appears to reverse in the following seven 
quarters. The ERC results shows continuing decline over the eight quarters. The 
determinants for these results are investigated by two different assumptions, which are 
not mutually exclusive: information uncertainty and management motivation for M&A. 
For information uncertainty, by differentiating the nationality and public status of targets, 
and the level of differences of industry of M&A, I hypothesize that M&A with foreign 
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and private targets and inter-industry M&A increase information uncertainty, and thus 
investors show a low response to the fmancial reporting of the acquirers, and have 
difficulty in valuing the acquirers. With respect to the ERC results, I find that investors 
believe acquirers with foreign targets experience a greater decrease in financial reporting 
quality than acquirers with domestic targets. Also, I find that investors think acquirers 
with private targets experience less of a decline in financial reporting quality than 
acquirers with public targets. However, I fail to find that investors show less investor 
reaction to the quality of fmancial reporting for inter-industry acquirers later after M&A. 
With respect to the value relevance results, I find that the results are similar to the ERC 
results for foreign and private targets, but find that the value relevance of earnings of 
acquirers with inter-industry targets is lower than that of acquirers with inter-industry 
targets. For a management motivation for M&A, my ERC results show that investors 
have less confidence in financial statements after M&A for both synergy-motivated and 
agency-motivated acquirers, but it is not sure there is a quality difference in fmancial 
reporting of both acquirer groups. With respect to value relevance, investors think the 
value relevance of earnings for agency-motivated acquirers is less than that of synergy-
motivated acquirers after M&A. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in financial reporting quality by 
examining the quality of fmancial information for acquirers following consolidating 
financial statements after M&A. In addition, by using two different measures of investor 
reaction to the quality of fmancial reporting of acquirers, this study provides an 
opportunity to examine whether the measure with the short measurement windows 
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expectation (the ERC) is different from one with the long measurement windows 
expectation (the valuation). This study finds differences between the two analyses are 
different with respect to the recovery of the decline in the quality of fmancial 
information. While the decline in the value relevance in the quarter immediately after an 
M&A appears to reverse in the following seven quarters, the ERC results show 
continuing decline over the eight quarters. This difference between the ERC results of 
lack of recovery of the quality in financial reporting and the quick recovery of the 
earnings in the valuation models may be attributed to the short measurement window and 
the incorporation of market expectation of earnings (i.e., using an unexpected earnings 
measure) in the ERC analysis versus the use of an earnings measure without 
incorporating expectations and a long-window analysis in the valuation models. Despite 
the immediate decline of fmancial reporting quality after M&A with both measures, the 
results of recovery of the decline quality in financial reporting indicates that short 
window and expectation put in the ERC measure leads to the continuous declines of the 
quality while longer periods of investigation and no expectation in the valuation measure 
shows a quick recovery in subsequent periods. By differentiating the characteristics of 
acquirers and targets causing information uncertainty, this study shows how these 
influence investors' perceptions of information released around M&A. Investigating 
management motivation for M&A preceding M&A also enables us to see how M&A 
motivation affects the quality of financial statements after M&A. Lastly, quarterly 
intervals of time-series examination of financial reporting quality help us to take a better 
look at changes in quality over time compared to an annual cross-sectional examination. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Defmition 
Variable Name Definition 
Acquirers'financial data 
CAR The cumulative abnormal return for firm i at quarter t, continuously 
compounded over three days around earnings announcement. The abnormal 
return is the firm's return less the CRSP value-weighted market return. 
QT 
UE 
MB 
SIZE 
LOSS 
Q4 
EA 
BV 
An indicator variable equal to one if firm i's earning announcement belongs 
to quarter, where t=O is the last quarter before M&A, and the eight quarters 
following M&A are denoted tE{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8} and zero otherwise. 
The unexpected earnings for firm i at quarter t's earnings announcement 
date scaled 
by the price of the end of the quarter. The expected earnings are measured 
as the latest mean of the analysts' forecast before earnings announcement 
date. 
The market-to-book value ratio as of the end of the quarter. The closing 
price divided by total assets minus total liabilities per share at the end of the 
quarter. 
The natural logarithm of the market value at the end of quarter. 
An indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a negative value in net incc 
the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. 
An indicator variable equal to one if the earnings announcement is for the 
four quarter of the firm's fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
The net income per share at the end of quarter. 
The total assets less the total liabilities per share at the end of the quarter. 
Indicator variables for subsamples (IND) 
FOR 
PRJ 
!NT 
An indicator variable equal to one if target is a foreign firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
An indicator variable equal to one if target is a private firm, and zero 
otherwise. 
An indicator variable equal to one if industries of an acquirer and a target 
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AGN 
are different, and acquirers are less diversified firm, and zero otherwise. 
An indicator variable equal to one if CAR of acquiring firms at M&A 
announcement is lower than median. 
Deal characteristics 
EA LAG 
DEALSIZE 
The number of days between M&A completion date and the first earnings 
announcement date after M&A. 
Difference in total assets between last pre-M&A and first post-M&A 
quarters I market value of acquiring firm at the end ofM&A completion 
quarter. 
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Table 1 Sample Selection and Distribution of Quarters 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
ERC Valuation 
Obs. Obs. 
Number of quarters with a single and multiple M&A activities 38,141 38,141 
Less (7,447) (7,447) 
Multiple M&A activities 
Not available relative deal size (undisclosed) (12,099) (12,099) 
Relative deal size less than 3% (5,509) (5,509) 
Any significant M&A within two quarters before quarter t (2,483) (2,483) 
More than 13 7 days between completion and earnings (745) (745) 
announcement 
Not available consecutive COMPUSTAT at t-1 and t (326) 
Not available COMPUSTAT at t (63) 
Not available consecutive CRSP data (t-1 and t) (598) 
Not available consecutive IDES data (t-1 and t) (2,548) 
Not available acquiring firm's price data three month after quarter t (92) 
Distribution is > 99% or< 1% for some variables between t-1 and t (680) 
Distribution is > 99% or < 1% for some variables at t (496) 
Total number of quarters with a single M&A activities 5,706 9,207 
(Total number of firms with a single activities) (3,610) (5,545) 
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Panel B: Yearly distribution 
ERC No. of No. of Valuation No. of No. of Obs. Firms Obs. Firms 
1991 124 124 1991 221 210 
1992 136 136 1992 265 264 
1993 213 211 1993 362 355 
1994 253 251 1994 494 491 
1995 297 294 1995 512 508 
1996 348 341 1996 594 585 
1997 431 421 1997 751 735 
1998 419 414 1998 733 717 
1999 346 344 1999 646 640 
2000 268 265 2000 560 552 
2001 306 301 2001 505 498 
2002 276 275 2002 447 443 
2003 248 248 2003 382 381 
2004 368 364 2004 516 511 
2005 343 341 2005 471 466 
2006 359 354 2006 465 458 
2007 325 325 2007 433 431 
2008 259 256 2008 335 333 
2009 140 139 2009 214 212 
2010 244 239 2010 297 292 
2011 3 3 2011 4 4 
Total 5,706 5,646 Total 9,207 9,086 
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Panel C: Industry distribution 
ERC Valuation 
SIC Industry Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. No. No. 
2 Agricultural Production 0 0.00% 1 0.01% 
7 Agricultural Services 5 0.09% 5 0.06% 
8 Forestry 5 0.09% 5 0.06% 
10 Metal Mining 21 0.40% 40 0.47% 
12 Coal Mining 13 0.25% 18 0.21% 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 281 5.33% 424 5.01% 
14 Mining and Quarrying ofNonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 5 0.09% 5 0.06% 
15 Building Cnstrctn - General Contractors & Operative Builders 32 0.61% 42 0.50% 
16 Heavy Cnstrctn, Except Building Construction -Contractors 16 0.30% 20 0.24% 
17 Construction - Special Trade Contractors 15 0.28% 23 0.27% 
20 Food and Kindred Products 79 1.50% 124 1.47% 
21 Tobacco Products 4 0.08% 3 0.04% 
22 Textile Mill Products 31 0.59% 40 0.47% 
23 Apparel, Finished Prdcts from Fabrics & Similar Materials 47 0.89% 79 0.93% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 29 0.55% 41 0.48% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 21 0.40% 30 0.35% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 68 1.29% 88 1.04% 
27 Printing, Publishing and Allied Industries 58 1.10% 91 1.08% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 318 6.03% 479 5.66% 
29 Petroleum Refming and Related Industries 32 0.61% 39 0.46% 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 46 0.87% 75 0.89% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 19 0.36% 27 0.32% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 20 0.38% 32 0.38% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 86 1.63% 108 1.28% 
34 Fabricated Metal Prdcts, Except Machinery & Transport Eqpmnt 75 1.42% 112 1.32% 
35 Ind~strial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Eqmpment 294 5.58% 485 5.73% 
36 Electronic, Elctrcl Eqpmnt & Cmpnts, Excpt Computer Eqpmnt 469 8.90% 720 8.51% 
3 7 Transportation Equipment 120 2.28% 152 1.80% 
38 Mesr/Anlyz/Cntrl Instrmnts; Photo/Med/Opt Gds; Watchs/Clocks 390 7.40% 598 7.07% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 47 0.89% 80 0.95% 
40 Railroad Transportation 13 0.25% 16 0.19% 
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41 Local, Suburban Transit & Interurbn Hgwy Passenger Transport 2 0.04% 6 0.07% 
42 Motor Freight Transportation 29 0.55% 38 0.45% 
44 Water Transportation 21 0.40% 21 0.25% 
45 Transportation by Air 16 0.30% 25 0.30% 
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 15 0.28% 20 0.24% 
4 7 Transportation Services 17 0.32% 31 0.37% 
48 Communications 120 2.28% 245 2.89% 
49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 175 3.32% 264 3.12% 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 93 1.76% 159 1.88% 
51 Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 59 1.12% 100 1.18% 
52 Building Matrials, Hrdwr, Garden Supply & Mobile Home Dealrs 2 0.04% 4 0.05% 
53 General Merchandise Stores 28 0.53% 36 0.43% 
54 Food Stores 25 0.47% 31 0.37% 
55 Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 14 0.27% 27 0.32% 
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores 30 0.57% 37 0.44% 
57 Home Furniture, Furnishings and Equipment Stores 14 0.27% 27 0.32% 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 40 0.76% 79 0.93% 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 72 1.37% 116 1.37% 
60 Depository Institutions 614 11.65% 993 11.73% 
61 Nondepository Credit Institutions 36 0.68% 58 0.69% 
62 Sec~ty & Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges & Servtces 73 1.39% 91 1.08% 
63 Insurance Carriers 129 2.45% 162 1.91% 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 20 0.38% 33 0.39% 
65 Real Estate 7 0.13% 25 0.30% 
67 Holding and Other Investment Offices 206 3.91% 583 6.89% 
70 Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 40 0.76% 68 0.80% 
72 Personal Services 16 0.30% 25 0.30% 
73 Business Services 805 15.28% 1,322 15.62% 
75 Automotive Repair, Services and Parking 10 0.19% 12 0.14% 
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 5 0.09% 9 0.11% 
78 Motion Pictures 15 0.28% 39 0.46% 
79 Amusement and Recreation Services 33 0.63% 67 0.79% 
80 Health Services 142 2.69% 231 2.73% 
81 Legal Services 1 0.02% 2 0.02% 
82 Educational Services 12 0.23% 27 0.32% 
83 Social Services 8 0.15% 10 0.12% 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management Svcs 103 1.95% 182 2.15% 
Total 2,559 48.56% 4,396 51.94% 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Regression Variables (ERC) 
Pre-M&A (t=O) 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev lQ 3Q 
CAR 5,706 0.0008 0.0004 0.0680 -0.0331 0.0359 
UE 5,706 0.0000 0.0003 0.0051 -0.0007 0.0015 
MB 5,706 2.8117 2.1640 2.1720 1.5149 3.2703 
SIZE+ 5,706 2397 527 9600 189 1536 
LOSS 5,706 0.1607 0 0.3673 0 0 
Q4 5,706 0.2417 0 0.4281 0 0 
EA LAG 5,706 77 77 29 54 100 
DEALSIZE 5,706 0.1855 0.1106 0.1967 0.0594 0.2294 
Post-M&A (t=1) 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev lQ 3Q 
CAR 5,706 0.0014 0.0017 0.0731 -0.0341 0.0395 
UE 5,706 -0.0008 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0072 -0.0013 0.0014 
MB 5,706 2.6448 *** 2.0645 *** 1.9944 1.4513 3.1163 
SIZE+ 5,706 2633 561 ** 10621 204 1618 
LOSS 5,706 0.2518 *** 0 *** 0.4341 0 1 
Q4 5,706 0.2373 0 0.4255 0 0 
EA LAG 5,706 77 77 29 54 100 
DEALSIZE 5,706 0.1855 0.1106 0.1967 0.0594 0.2294 
Variable CAR, UE, MB, andDEALSIZE are truncated at 1% and -1% to mitigate the influence 
outliers. 
**,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
+: Millions in dollars 
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Panel B: Regression Variables (Valuation) 
Pre-M&A(t=O) 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev lQ 3Q 
PRICE 9,282 20.1154 16.7500 15.3516 8.0000 28.0600 
E 9,282 0.2231 0.1854 0.3960 0.0154 0.4115 
BV 9,282 9.4517 7.5080 7.5815 3.6925 13.2725 
Post-M&A(t= 1) 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev lQ 3Q 
PRICE 9,207 20.0092 16.5000 15.5573 7.8800 28.1870 
E 9,207 0.1298 *** 0.1432 *** 0.5045 -0.0468 0.3719 
BV 9,207 9.9673 *** 7.9526 *** 7.9393 3.9058 13.8624 
PRICE, EA and BVare truncated at 1% and -1% to mitigate the influence outliers. 
***:Significantly different between pre- and post-M&A at 0.01level (two-tailed). 
+: Millions in dollars 
Panel C: Subsample Distribution (ERC and Valuation, t= 1) 
ERC Valuation 
Subsample Obs. No. Percentage Subsample Obs. No. Percentage 
u.s. 5,011 87.82% u.s. 8,209 89.16% 
Foreign 695 12.18% Foreign 998 10.84% 
Public 1,317 23.08% Public 1,919 20.84% 
Private 4,389 76.92% Private 7,288 79.16% 
Intra-industry 5,033 89.05% Intra-industry 7,733 84.87% 
Inter-industry 619 10.95% Inter-industry 1,379 15.13% 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix (t=l) 
Pane/A: ERC 
In this table, bold text indicates significance at the 0.01level (two-tailed). 
CAR UE MB SIZE LOSS Q4 EA_LAG DEAL 
SIZE 
CAR 1 0.2781 0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0868 -0.0110 -0.0097 0.0138 
UE 0.1875 1 0.0396 0.0910 -0.1457 -0.0100 -0.0167 -0.0375 
MB -0.0086 0.0413 1 0.2412 0.0170 0.0125 -0.0354 -0.2431 
SIZE -0.0042 0.0170 0.0953 1 -0.1286 0.0328 -0.0513 -0.1341 
LOSS -0.0938 -0.2341 0.0795 -0.0302 1 -0.0028 0.0028 0.1431 
Q4 -0.0096 -0.0044 0.0157 0.0278 -0.0028 1 0.1206 0.0158 
EA LAG -0.0107 -0.0446 -0.0373 -0.0393 0.0069 0.1272 1 0.0282 
DEALSIZE 0.0149 -0.0720 -0.1838 -0.0242 0.1346 0.0079 0.0391 1 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are included below (above) the diagonal. 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRICE EA BV 
PRICE 1 0.5514 0.6998 
E 0.4035 1 0.5594 
BV 0.6401 0.4338 1 
In this table, bold text indicates significance at the 0.01level (two-tailed). 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are included below (above) the diagonal. 
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Table 4 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A 
Panel A: ERC 
CARit = O.i + L~=l a2,tQTit + P1UEit + L~=1 fJz,tUEit * QTit +Controlsit +cit 
where Controlsit = yiMBit + y 2SIZEit + y3LOSSit + Y4Q4it + y5EA_LAGit + y7DEALSIZEit 
Change of Coefficient on UE Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Pre d. Coeff. (1) ERC (1) (2) 
Sign 
0 /h + 3.0236 *** Pi 3.0236 *** 
1 p2,1 -0.8490 *** Pi+ P2,i 2.1746 *** +++ 
2 P2.2 -1.4557 *** Pi+ P2.2 1.5679 *** +++ 
3 P2.3 -0.9724 *** Pi+ P2.3 2.0512 *** +++ 
4 P2.4 -1.5827 *** Pi+ P2.4 1.4409 *** +++ 
5 P2.5 -1.9703 *** Pi+ P2.5 1.0534 *** +++ 
6 P2.6 -1.9139 *** Pi+ P2,6 1.1097 *** +++ 
7 p2,7 -2.0453 *** Pi+ P2,7 0.9783 *** +++ 
8 P2.s -1.6957 *** Pi+ P2.s 1.3279 *** +++ 
MB -0.0002 
SIZE -0.0008 *** 
LOSS -0.0063 *** 
Q4 0.0018 ** 
EA LAG 0.0000 
DEALSIZE 0.0007 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 39,041 
Adj. R-sqr 0.0342 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the p1 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Combined Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + P1Eit + P:zBVit +cit 
QRT /!_1 /!_2 Adj. R2 
0 11.8363 *** 0.9231 *** 0.4674 
1 4.7861 *** 1.1247 *** 0.4412 
2 10.3815 *** 0.9867 *** 0.4926 
3 9.9603 *** 1.0081 *** 0.4948 
4 10.0065 *** 1.0033 *** 0.5006 
5 10.0328 *** 1.0117 *** 0.4940 
6 10.1336 *** 1.0067 *** 0.5141 
7 9.4080 *** 1.0505 *** 0.5078 
8 9.4724 *** 1.0226 *** 0.4984 
***:Significantly different between pre- and post-M&A at 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Panel C: Recovery o(R-square 
R-sq = a1 + P1TIMEit + cit 
*: Significantly different from zero at 0.1level (two-tailed). 
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Panel D: Valuation 
Change of Coefficient on E 
QRT Pred. Coeff. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
/h 
f3v 
/32.2 
j32,3 
/32.4 
/32,5 
/32.6 
/32.7 
/32.8 
BV 
Year Effect 
No. ofObs. 
Sign 
+ 10.7697 
-5.3309 
-0.6783 
-0.8847 
-0.9159 
-0.8144 
-0.7079 
-1.0746 
-1.1927 
1.0181 
YES 
78,288 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4898 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
(1) Val. (1) (2) 
*** /31 10.7697 *** 
*** /31 + /32,1 5.4388 *** +++ 
* /31 + j32,2 10.0915 *** + 
** /31 + /32,3 9.8850 *** ++ 
** /31 + /32.4 9.8538 *** ++ 
** /31 + /32,5 9.9553 *** ++ 
* /31 + /32.6 10.0618 *** + 
*** /31 + /32.7 9.6951 *** +++ 
*** /31 + /32,8 9.5771 *** +++ 
*** 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the ~1 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, 
respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 5 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Domestic Target versus 
Foreign Target 
Panel A: ERC 
CARu = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a1FOR; +1:~= 1 a4,tQTit *FORi+ P1UEit + L~=1 Pz,tUEit * 
QTit + P1UEit*FOR; + L~=1 P4tUEit * QTit *FORi+ Controlsu+ cit 
Change of Coefficient on UE 
QRT Coeff. {1} Coeff. {1} 
0 /31 2.9787 *** /33 0.3940 
1 /32,1 -0.7768 *** /34.1 -0.5857 
2 /32,2 -1.4872 *** /34,2 0.2829 
3 /32,3 -0.9750 *** /34,3 -0.0904 
4 /32.4 -1.7343 *** /34.4 0.8490 
5 /h5 -1.8111 *** /34,5 -0.9672 
6 /32,6 -2.0019 *** /34.6 0.6291 
7 /h7 -2.1353 *** /34,7 0.2123 
8 /32,8 -1.6049 *** /34,8 -0.7108 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Domestic Target {1} {2} Foreign Target {1) {2} {3} 
0 /h 2.9787 *** /31 + /33 3.3728 *** 
1 /31 + /32,1 2.2019 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +/33 + /34,1 2.0103 *** ++ !! 
2 /31 + /32,2 1.4916 *** +++ /31 + /32.2 +[33 + /34,2 2.1685 *** + 
3 /31 + /32,3 2.0037 *** +++ /31 + /32,3 +/33 + /34,3 2.3074 *** + 
4 /31 + /32.4 1.2444 *** +++ /31 + /32.4 +[33 + /34,4 2.4874 *** !!! 
5 /31 + /32,5 1.1677 *** +++ /31 + /32,5 +/33 + /34,5 0.5945 *** +++ !! 
6 /31 + /32.6 0.9768 *** +++ /31 + /32,6 +/33 + /34.6 2.0000 *** ++ !!! 
7 /31 + /32.7 0.8435 *** +++ /31 + /32,7 +[33 + /34,7 1.4499 *** +++ !! 
8 /31 + /32,8 1.3738 *** +++ /31 + /32,8 +[33 + /34,8 1.0570 *** +++ 
MB -0.0002 Year Effect YES 
SIZE -0.0008 *** No. ofObs. 39,041 
LOSS -0.0063 *** Adj. R-sqr 0.0352 
Q4 0.0018 ** 
EA LAG 0.0000 
DEALSIZE 0.0010 
(1) *, **,***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.011evels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the P1+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, ! !, ! ! !: Significantly different from the .131+.132 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Combined Valuation 
PRICEit = (/,] + PIEit + P:zBVit + 6it 
QRT PI P2 Adj. R2 
Domestic Targets 
0 12.0443 *** 0.8945 *** 0.4649 
1 4.6947 *** 1.1078 *** 0.4383 
2 10.2266 *** 0.9708 *** 0.4895 
3 10.0683 *** 0.9878 *** 0.4928 
4 10.0218 *** 0.9888 *** 0.4985 
5 9.9135 *** 0.9945 *** 0.4907 
6 9.9263 *** 0.9930 *** 0.5096 
7 9.4120 *** 1.0260 *** 0.5006 
8 9.6495 *** 0.9968 *** 0.4942 
Foreign Targets 
0 10.5908 *** 1.1990 *** 0.5061 
1 5.2398 *** 1.3231 *** 0.4788 
2 11.1357 *** 1.1679 *** 0.5299 
3 8.9452 *** 1.2169 *** 0.5246 
4 9.2854 *** 1.1775 *** 0.5277 
5 10.6049 *** 1.2162 *** 0.5418 
6 11.6508 *** 1.1552 *** 0.5656 
7 8.9590 *** 1.2894 *** 0.5699 
8 8.2237 *** 1.2553 *** 0.5459 
***: Significantly different from zero at O.Ollevel (two-tailed). 
Panel C: Recovery o(R-square 
R-sq = a1 + PITIMEit + P2FORit + P1TIMEit *FORit +eit 
PI = 0.0058** 
P1 = 0.0038 
**: Significantly different from zero at 0.05level (two-tailed). 
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Panel D: Valuation 
PRICEit = 0.1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + o.3FORi +L~=1 a4,tQTit *FORi+ P1Eit + L~=1 P2,tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit*F0Ri + L~=1P4tEit * QTit *FORi+ )'JBVit +Cit 
Change of Coefficient on E 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 Pi 10.5946 *** p3 1.2195 
1 hi -5.3852 *** P4.1 0.4400 
2 P2.2 -0.8067 * p4,2 1.5295 
3 P2.3 -0.8031 * p4,3 -0.3236 
4 p2,4 -0.8810 ** P4.4 -0.1426 
5 p2,5 -0.8838 ** P4.s 1.0145 
6 P2.6 -0.8533 ** p4,6 1.9262 
7 P2.7 -1.0950 *** p4,7 0.3964 
8 p2,8 -1.0291 ** p4,8 -0.8816 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Domestic Target (1) (2) Foreign Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 Pi 10.5946 *** Pi+ P3 11.8140 *** 
1 Pi+ P2.1 5.2094 *** +++ Pi + P2.i +P3 + P4.i 6.8688 *** +++ !! 
2 Pi+ P2.2 9.7879 *** + Pi + P2.2 +P3 + P4.2 12.5368 *** !!! 
3 Pi+ P2.3 9.7915 *** + Pi + P2.3 +P3 + P4.3 10.6874 *** 
4 Pi+P2,4 9.7135 *** ++ Pi + P2.4 +P3 + P4.4 10.7904 *** 
5 Pi+ P2.5 9.7108 *** ++ Pi + P2.5 +P3 + P4.s 11.9448 *** !!! 
6 Pi + P2.6 9.7412 *** ++ Pi + P2.6 +P3 + P4.6 12.8869 *** !!! 
7 Pi+ P2.7 9.4996 *** +++ Pi + P2.7 +P3 + P4.7 11.1154 *** !! 
8 Pi+ P2.a 9.5654 *** ++ Pi + P2.a +P3 + P4.a 9.9033 *** + 
BV 1.0189 *** YearEffect YES 
No. ofObs. 78,131 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4909 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the IH +J33 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!! , !!!:Significantly different from the .(31+!32 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 6 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Public Target versus 
Private Target 
Pane/A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a1PRl; +L~=l a 4,tQTit * PRii+ P1UEu + L~=1 /lz,tUEit * 
QTit + P1UEu*PRI; + L~=tfl4tUEit * QTit * PRii+ Controlsit+ E:it 
Change of Coefficient on UE 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 /li 3.0387 *** /l3 -0.0220 
1 /ll, l -1.8880 *** /l4,1 1.3194 ** 
2 /l2,2 -1.2864 ** /l4.2 -0.2009 
3 /l2,3 -0.6360 /l4,3 -0.3704 
4 /l2,4 -1.1822 * /l4.4 -0.4524 
5 /l2,5 -1.8878 *** /l4,5 -0.0874 
6 /l2.6 -1.6785 *** /l4,6 -0.2831 
7 /l2,7 -1.9844 *** /l4.7 -0.0689 
8 /l2,8 -1.3546 ** /l4,8 -0.3850 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Public Target (1) (2) Private Target (1) (2) 
0 /li 3.0387 *** /li + /l3 3.0167 *** 
1 /li + /l2,1 1.1507 *** +++ /li + /l2,1 +fl3 + /l4,1 2.4481 *** +++ 
2 /li + /l2,2 1.7523 *** ++ /li + /l2,2 +/l3 + /l4,2 1.5294 *** +++ 
3 /li + /l2,3 2.4026 *** /li + /l2,3 +fl3 + /l4,3 2.0102 *** +++ 
4 /li + /l2.4 1.8565 *** + /li + /l2,4 +{J3 + /l4.4 1.3822 *** +++ 
5 /li + /l2,5 1.1509 *** +++ /li + /l2,5 +{J3 + /l4,5 1.0415 *** +++ 
6 /li + /l2,6 1.3602 *** +++ /li + /l2,6 +/l3 + /l4,6 1.0551 *** +++ 
7 /li + /l2,7 1.0542 *** +++ /li + /l2,7 +fl3 + /l4,7 0.9633 *** +++ 
8 /li + /l2,8 1.6841 *** ++ /li + /l2,8 +/l3 + /l4,8 1.2771 *** +++ 
MB -0.0002 Year Effect YES 
SIZE -0.0009 *** No. ofObs. 39,041 
LOSS -0.0064 *** Adj. R-sqr 0.0344 
Q4 0.0017 ** 
EA LAG 0.0000 
DEALSIZE 0.0007 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(3) 
!!! 
(2) +, ++, +++:Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.011evels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!, !!! : Significantly different from the !31+{32 at 0.1. 0.05. and 0.01leve1s, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Combined Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + P1Eit + PlBV;t + 8it 
QRT P1 P2 Adj. R2 
Public Targets 
0 12.6864 *** 0.8444 *** 0.4670 
1 3.5593 *** 1.1664 *** 0.4441 
2 11.9256 *** 0.8746 *** 0.4687 
3 11.0476 *** 0.9465 *** 0.4833 
4 10.7768 *** 0.9522 *** 0.4801 
5 10.4797 *** 0.9449 *** 0.4581 
6 11.0559 *** 0.9668 *** 0.4968 
7 11.9828 *** 0.9617 *** 0.4977 
8 11.1943 *** 0.9376 *** 0.4902 
Private 
Targets 
0 11.1836 *** 0.9266 *** 0.4461 
1 5.4920 *** 1.0591 *** 0.4240 
2 9.7943 *** 0.9916 *** 0.4828 
3 9.4631 *** 1.0034 *** 0.4807 
4 9.6450 *** 0.9924 *** 0.4923 
5 9.7406 *** 1.0095 *** 0.4899 
6 9.7268 *** 0.9978 *** 0.5074 
7 8.5421 *** 1.0577 *** 0.5017 
8 8.7703 *** 1.0306 *** 0.4933 
***: Significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Panel C: Recovery o[R-square 
R-sq = a1 + P1TIMEit + P2PRlit + P1TIMEit *PRI;r +eit 
P1 = o.ooss** 
P1 = 0.0002 
**: Significantly different from zero at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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Panel D: Valuation 
PRICEit = a.1 + L~=1 az,tQTit + a.1PR1i +L~=1 a4,tQTit * PR/i+ P1Eit + L~=1 Pz,tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit*PRI; + L~=1P4tEit * QTit * PRii+ yJBV;t +Cit 
Change of Coefficient on E 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 PI 11.1001 *** p3 -0.6876 
p2,I -6.7461 *** p4,I 2.2520 *** 
2 p2,2 -0.3947 P4.2 -0.2330 
3 p2,3 -0.5002 p4,3 -0.3347 
4 P2.4 -0.8494 P4.4 0.0984 
5 p2,5 -1.1982 P4.5 0.7025 
6 P2.6 -0.3064 PM -0.2597 
7 Pv 0.6604 p4,7 -2.0172 ** 
8 p2,8 -0.0176 p4,8 -1.2367 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Public Target (1) (2) Private Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 PI 11.1001 *** PI+ p3 10.4126 *** 
1 PI+ p2,I 4.3540 *** +++ PI + p2,I +P3 + p4,I 5.9184 *** +++ !!! 
2 PI+ p2,2 10.7054 *** PI + p2,2 +P3 + P4.2 9.7848 *** 
3 PI+ p2,3 10.5999 *** PI + p2,3 +P3 + p4,3 9.5777 *** + 
4 PI+ P2.4 10.2507 *** PI + P2.4 +P3 + p4,4 9.6615 *** 
5 PI+hs 9.9019 *** PI + p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 9.9168 *** 
6 PI+ p2,6 10.7937 *** PI + p2,6 +P3 +PM 9.8465 *** 
7 PI+ Pv 11.7606 *** PI + p2,7 +P3 + p4,7 9.0559 *** +++ !!! 
8 PI+ p2,8 11.0826 *** PI + p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 9.1583 *** +++ !!! 
BV 0.9944 *** Year Effect YES 
No. of Obs. 78,131 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4936 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!,!!!:Significantly different from the .131+(32 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 7 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Intra- versus Inter-
industry 
Panel A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3INT; +}:~=l a 4,tQTit *INTi+ P1UEit + L~=1 Pz,tUEit * 
QTtt+ P3UE;,*INT; + L~=lP4tUEtt * QTtt *INTi+ Controlsit+ eit 
Change of Coefficient on UE 
QRT Coeff. (1) (1) 
0 /h 3.0558 *** /h -0.2131 ** 
1 /hi -0.9305 *** /hi 0.7721 
2 /32.2 -1.3926 *** /34.2 0.2647 
3 /32,3 -0.9800 *** /34,3 0.3795 
4 /32,4 -1.4878 *** /34.4 -0.1695 
5 /32,5 -1.9425 *** /34,5 0.0769 
6 /32.6 -1.8126 *** /34,6 -0.5415 
7 /32,7 -2.1101 *** /34,7 1.4471 *** 
8 /32,8 -1.6923 *** /34,8 0.2465 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Intra-industry (1) (2) Inter-industry (1) (2) (3) 
0 /3I 3.0558 *** 
1 /3I + /32,I 2.1253 *** 
2 /3I + /32.2 1.6632 *** 
3 /3I + /32.3 2.0758 *** 
4 /3I + /32.4 1.5680 *** 
5 /3I + /32,5 1.1133 *** 
6 /3I + /32.6 1.2433 *** 
7 /3I + /32,7 0.9457 *** 
8 /31 + /32.8 1.3635 *** 
MB -0.0002 
SIZE -0.0008 *** 
LOSS -0.0064 *** 
Q4 0.0018 ** 
EA LAG 0.0000 
DEALSIZE 0.0007 
/3I + /33 
+++ /3I + /32,I +/33 + /34,1 
+++ /3I + /32,2 +/33 + /34,2 
+++ /3I + /32,3 +/33 + /34,3 
+++ /3I + /32.4 +/33 + /34.4 
+++ /3I + /32,5 +/33 + /34,5 
+++ /3I + /32,6 +/33 + /34.6 
+++ /31 + /32,7 +/33 + /34,7 
+++ /31 + /32.8 +/33 + /34,8 
Year Effect 
No. ofObs. 
Adj. R-sqr 
2.8427 *** 
2.6843 *** 
1.7148 *** ++ 
2.2422 *** + 
1.1855 *** +++ 
0.9771 *** +++ 
0.4887 *** +++ 
2.1797 *** 
1.3969 *** +++ 
YES 
38,646 
0.0345 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
!! 
!!! 
!!! 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the P1+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!,!!!:Significantly different from the .(31+{32 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Combined Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + P1Eit + P:zBVu +cit 
QRT /!_I P2 Adj . R2 
Intra-industry 
0 11.4869 *** 0.9551 *** 0.4640 
1 4.8111 *** 1.1480 *** 0.4432 
2 10.4173 *** 1.0044 *** 0.4943 
3 9.9774 *** 1.0217 *** 0.4924 
4 10.2786 *** 1.0178 *** 0.4996 
5 9.8444 *** 1.0405 *** 0.4931 
6 10.4571 *** 1.0190 *** 0.5149 
7 9.3970 *** 1.0704 *** 0.5097 
8 9.8206 *** 1.0365 *** 0.5010 
Inter-industry 
0 10.6273 *** 0.7940 *** 0.4897 
1 3.4105 *** 0.9943 *** 0.4465 
2 8.1172 *** 0.9060 *** 0.4814 
3 7.8094 *** 0.9350 *** 0.5145 
4 7.4345 *** 0.8966 *** 0.5247 
5 9.2023 *** 0.8765 *** 0.4997 
6 6.2009 *** 0.9507 *** 0.5273 
7 7.7901 *** 0.9403 *** 0.5029 
8 6.9450 *** 0.9202 *** 0.5008 
***: Significantly different from zero at O.Ollevel (two-tailed). 
Panel C: Recovery o(R-square 
R-sq = a1 + P1TIMEit + P2INTit + P3TlMEit *INT;t +cit 
PI= 0.0065* 
P3= -o.ooo5 
*: Significantly different from zero at O.Ollevel (two-tailed). 
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Panel D: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3!NT; +.L~=l a4,tQTit *INTi+ P1E;t + L~=l Pz.tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit*INT; + L~=1P4tEit * QTit *INTi+ yJBVit +Cit 
Change of Coefficient on E 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 Iii 10.7640 *** p3 -2.7002 *** 
1 p2,1 -5.2052 *** p4,I 0.4913 
2 p2,2 -0.4608 p4,2 -0.5472 
3 p2,3 -0.7393 * p4,3 -0.0651 
4 p2,4 -0.5186 PM -1.0853 
5 p2,5 -0.7387 * P4.s 0.6328 
6 p2,6 -0.2787 p4,6 -1.9147 
7 P2.7 -0.9445 ** p4,7 0.2013 
8 p2,8 -0.7422 * p4,8 -0.7133 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Intra-industry (1) (2) Inter-industry (1) (2) (3) 
0 PI 10.7640 *** PI+ p3 8.0638 *** !!! 
1 PI+ P2.I 5.5588 *** +++ PI + p2,I +P3 + P4.I 3.3498 *** +++ !!! 
2 PI+ p2,2 10.3032 *** PI + p2,2 +P3 + P4.2 7.0557 *** !!! 
3 PI+ p2,3 10.0247 *** + PI + p2,3 +P3 + p4,3 7.2594 *** !!! 
4 PI+ P2.4 10.2454 *** PI + p2,4 +P3 +PM 6.4599 *** !!! 
5 PI+ p2,5 10.0253 *** + PI + p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 7.9578 *** !! 
6 PI+ p2,6 10.4853 *** PI + p2,6 +P3 + p4,6 5.8704 *** ++ !!! 
7 PI+ p2,7 9.8195 *** ++ PI + p2,7 +P3 + p4,7 7.3205 *** !!! 
8 PI+ p2,8 10.0218 *** + PI + p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 6.6083 *** + !!! 
BV 0.9944 *** Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 77,274 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4957 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.011evels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the PI+P3 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!, !!!:Significantly different from the 131+132 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 8 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Synergy-motivated versus 
Agency-motivated Acquirers 
Panel A: ERC 
CARit = a.1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a.3AGNi +L~=l a4,tQTit * AGNi+ PzUE;, + L~=1 P2,tUEit * 
QTit + P3UE;,*AGN; + L~=lP4tUEit * QTit * AGNi+ Controlsit+ cit 
Change of Coefficient on UE 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 /31 3.4669 *** /33 -0.4324 
1 /32,1 -1.0263 *** /34,1 0.0367 
2 {h2 -2.0204 *** /34,2 0.7985 * 
3 /32,3 -1.2059 *** /34,3 0.2091 
4 /32.4 -1.7018 *** /34.4 0.2418 
5 /32,5 -2.0673 *** /34,5 -0.1619 
6 /32,6 -2.3742 *** /34.6 0.5271 
7 /h7 -2.3011 *** /34,7 0.4886 
8 /32,8 -2.1151 *** /34,8 0.3312 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Synergy acquirer (1) (2) Agency acquirer (1) (2) (3) 
0 /31 3.4669 *** /31 + /33 3.0345 *** 
1 /31 + /32,1 2.4406 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +/33 + /34,1 2.0449 *** +++ 
2 /31 + /32.2 1.4465 *** +++ /31 + /32,2 +/33 + /34,2 1.8126 *** +++ 
3 /31 + /32,3 2.2610 *** +++ /31 + /32.3 +/33 + /34,3 2.0378 *** +++ 
4 /31 + /32.4 1.7651 *** +++ /31 + /32,4 +/33 + /34.4 1.5746 *** +++ 
5 /31 + /32,5 1.3996 *** +++ /31 + /32,5 +/33 + /34,5 0.8053 *** +++ !! 
6 /31 + /32.6 1.0927 *** +++ /31 + /32.6 +/33 + /34.6 1.1874 *** +++ 
7 /31 + /32,7 1.1658 *** +++ /31 + /32.7 +/33 + /34,7 1.2220 *** +++ 
8 /31 + /32,8 1.3518 *** +++ /31 + /32,8 +/33 + /34,8 1.2506 *** +++ 
MB -0.0002 Year Effect YES 
SIZE 
-0.0009 *** No. ofObs. 33,710 
LOSS -0.0054 *** Adj. R-sqr 0.0369 
Q4 0.0015 * 
EA LAG 0.0000 
DEALSIZE 0.0012 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!,!!!:Significantly different from the !31+£32 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Combined Valuation 
PRICEit = 0.] + PIEit + P:zBV;t +Bit 
QRT /!_I P2 Adj. R2 
Synergy Acguirer 
0 12.0111 *** 0.9514 *** 0.4541 
1 5.6335 *** 1.1209 *** 0.4202 
2 11.3075 *** 0.9763 *** 0.4851 
3 10.7668 *** 1.0161 *** 0.4823 
4 10.1422 *** 1.0273 *** 0.4915 
5 10.3449 *** 1.0395 *** 0.4934 
6 10.3055 *** 1.0193 *** 0.5067 
7 9.3781 *** 1.0527 *** 0.4922 
8 8.8539 *** 1.0394 *** 0.4813 
Agency Acquirer 
0 12.0825 *** 0.8702 *** 0.4779 
1 3.9384 *** 1.1285 *** 0.4508 
2 10.2865 *** 0.9774 *** 0.5029 
3 9.1362 *** 1.0079 *** 0.5095 
4 9.5787 *** 0.9793 *** 0.4962 
5 10.1494 *** 0.9643 *** 0.4959 
6 9.4071 *** 0.9767 *** 0.5024 
7 9.4256 *** 0.9965 *** 0.5020 
8 9.7100 *** 0.9773 *** 0.5050 
***: Significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
Panel C: Recovery o(R-square 
R-sq = 0.1 + P1TIME;t + P2AGNit + P1TIME;t *AGNit +cit 
PI= 0.0064* 
P1 = -o.oo22 
*: Significantly different from zero at 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
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Panel D: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + aJAGNi +L~=l a 4,tQTit * AGNi+ PzEit + L~=1 P2,tEit * 
QTit + P£it*AGN; + L~=tP4tEit * QTit * AGNt+ ')'JBV;, + Gjt 
Change of Coefficient on E 
QRT Coeff. (1) Coeff. (1) 
0 /31 11.4187 *** /33 -0.9778 
1 /32,1 -5.0780 *** /34,1 -0.7813 
2 /32.2 -0.2972 /34.2 -0.2642 
3 /32,3 -0.5304 /34,3 -0.8000 
4 /32,4 -1.1163 * /34,4 -0.0726 
5 /32.5 -0.7777 /34.5 -0.0427 
6 /32,6 -0.9105 /34.6 -0.4166 
7 /32.7 -1.6436 *** /34.7 0.5579 
8 /32,8 -2.2470 *** /34,8 1.3868 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Synergy Acquirer (1) (2) Agency Acquirer (1) (2) (3) 
0 /31 11.4187 *** /31 + /33 10.4410 *** 
1 /31 + /32,1 6.3408 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +/33 + /34,1 4.5817 *** +++ !!! 
2 /31 + /32,2 11.1215 *** /31 + /32.2 +/33 + /34.2 9.8796 *** !! 
3 /31 + /32.3 10.8883 *** /31 + /32,3 +/33 + /34,3 9.1106 *** ++ !!! 
4 /31 + /32.4 10.3024 *** + /31 + /32.4 +/33 + /34,4 9.2521 *** ++ 
5 /31 + /32,5 10.6410 *** /31 + /32,5 +/33 + /34,5 9.6206 *** 
6 /31 + /32.6 10.5082 *** /31 + /32,6 +/33 + /34.6 9.1139 *** ++ !! 
7 /31 + /32.7 9.7752 *** +++ /31 + /32,7 +/33 + /34,7 9.3553 *** + 
8 /31 + /32,8 9.1718 *** +++ /31 + /32,8 +/33 + /34,8 9.5808 *** 
BV 1.0073 *** Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 70,182 
Adj . R-sqr 0.4842 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !,!!,!!! : Significantly different from the !31+(32 at 0.1. 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 9 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A (1% and 5% deal) 
Panel A: ERC 
CARit = 0..1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + P1UEit + L:=1 P2,tUEit * QTit +Controlsit +cit 
where Controlsit = y1MBit + y 2SIZEit + y3LOSSit + Y4Q4it + y5EA_LAGit + y7DEALSIZEit 
Change of Coefficient on UE Sum of Coefficients on UE 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
QRT Pred. Coeff. (1) (1) ERC (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Si n 
0 f]j + 2.9196 *** 2.5989 *** PI 2.9196 *** 2.5989 *** 
1 P2.I - -0.7490 *** -0.9992 *** PI+ p2,I 2.1707 *** +++ 1.5997 *** +++ 
2 p2,2 - -1.3479 *** -1.0386 *** PI+ P2,2 1.5717 *** +++ 1.5603 *** +++ 
3 p2,3 - -0.8636 *** -0.5556 ** PI+ p2,3 2.0560 *** +++ 2.0433 *** ++ 
4 p2,4 - -1.4756 *** -1.1656 *** PI+ P2.4 1.4440 *** +++ 1.4333 *** +++ \0 
\0 5 p2,5 - -1.8649 *** -1.5497 *** PI+ p2,5 1.0547 *** +++ 1.0492 *** +++ 
6 P2.6 - -1.8081 *** -1.4962 *** PI+ P2.6 1.1115 *** +++ 1.1027 *** +++ 
7 p2,7 - -1.9405 *** -1.6250 *** PI+ P2.7 0.9791 *** +++ 0.9739 *** +++ 
8 p2,8 - -1.5893 *** -1.2767 *** PI+ p2,8 1.3304 *** +++ 1.3222 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. ofObs. 42,305 36,863 
Adj . R-sg,r 0.0341 0.0336 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the ~1 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a.1 + L~=l az,tQTit + P1Eit + L~=tPz,tEit * QTit + y1BVit + eit 
Change of Coefficient on E Sum of Coefficients on E 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
QRT Pred. Coeff. (1) (1) Val. (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Si n 
0 PI + 12.1199 *** 10.5564 *** PI 12.1199 *** 10.5564 *** 
1 p2,I - -5 .0545 *** -5.8133 *** PI+ P2.I 7.0654 *** +++ 4.7431 *** +++ 
2 p2,2 - -0.5185 -1.1464 *** PI+ p2,2 11.6014 *** 9.4100 *** +++ 
3 p2,3 - -0.8096 ** -1.6577 *** PI+ p2,3 11.3103 *** ++ 8.8988 *** +++ 
4 p2,4 - -0.9138 ** -1.3575 *** PI+ p2,4 11.2061 *** ++ 9.1989 *** +++ 
5 p2,5 - -0.8202 ** -1.4617 *** PI+ p2,5 11.2997 *** ++ 9.0947 *** +++ 
6 P2.6 - -0.6360 * -1.2772 *** PI+ p2,6 11.4839 *** + 9.2793 *** +++ 
-
7 p2,7 - -1.4792 *** -1.6738 *** PI+ p2,7 10.6407 *** +++ 8.8826 *** +++ 
0 8 p2,8 - -1.1660 *** -1.6919 *** PI+ p2,8 10.9539 *** +++ 8.8645 *** +++ 0 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. ofObs. 96,868 65,601 
Adj. R-sgr 0.4695 0.4994 
(1) *, **,***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the p1 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
-0 
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Table 10 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Domestic Target versus Foreign Target (1% and 5% deal) 
Pane/A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3FOR; +L~=l a4,tQTit *FORi+ P1UEit + L~=1 Pz,tUEit * QTit + PJUE;t*FOR; 
+ L~=tP4tUEit * QTit *FORi+ Controlsit+ eit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
QRT Domestic Target (1) (2) (1) (2) Foreign Target (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
0 PI 2.8587 *** 2.5293 *** PI+ p3 3.3520 *** 3.2164 *** 
1 PI+ Pv 2.1706 *** +++ 1.7710 *** +++ PI+ P2.I +P3 + P4.I 2.1823 *** ++ 0.8924 *** +++ !!! 
2 PI+ p2,2 1.4952 *** +++ 1.4841 *** ++ PI+ p2,2 +P3 + p4,2 2.1733 *** ++ 2.1608 *** 
3 PI+ p2,3 2.0077 *** +++ 1.9963 *** +++ PI+ p2,3 +P3 + P4.3 2.3151 *** + 2.2970 *** 
4 PI+ p2,4 1.2470 *** +++ 1.2368 *** +++ PI+ p2,4 +P3 + P4.4 2.4926 *** !!! 2.4796 *** !!! 
5 PI+ p2,5 1.1688 *** +++ 1.1629 *** +++ PI+ p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 0.5963 *** +++ !! 0.5925 *** +++ !! 
6 PI + P2.6 0.9788 *** +++ 0.9698 *** +++ PI + p2,6 +P3 + P4.6 1.9998 *** ++ ! ! ! 1.9931 *** + ! ! ! 
7 PI+ p2,7 0.8446 *** +++ 0.8397 *** +++ PI+ p2,7 +P3 + p4,7 1.4485 *** +++ !! 1.4434 *** +++ !! 
8 PI+ p2,8 1.3761 *** +++ 1.3681 *** +++ PI+ p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 1.0601 *** +++ 1.0510 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. of Obs. 42,305 36,863 
Adj. R-sqr 0.035 0.0348 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!!:Significantly different from the 131+132 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a.1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a.3FORi +:L~=l a 4,tQTit *FORi+ P1Eit + L~=1 Pz,tEit * QTit + P3Eit*FOR; + L~=1 P4tEit * 
QTit *FORi+ yJBVit +Cit 
Sum of Coefficients onE 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
QRT Domestic Target (1) (2) (1) (2) Foreign Target (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
0 j31 11.7086 *** 10.3656 *** j31 + j33 14.5096 *** 11.9651 *** 
1 j31 + j32,1 6.5971 *** +++ 4.5675 *** +++ j31 + j32,1 +j33 + j34,1 9.8982 *** +++ !!! 6.1551 *** +++ !! 
2 j3J+j32,2 11.2096 *** 9.1656 *** +++ j3J+j32,2+j33+j34,2 14.2102 *** !!! 11.6506 *** !!! 
3 f31 + j32,3 11.0968 *** 9.0319 *** +++ j31 + j32,3 +f33 + j34,3 12.5211 *** + ! 8.2401 *** +++ 
4 j31 + j32,4 10.9588 *** + 9.3164 *** ++ j31 + j32,4 +j33 + j34,4 12.4973 *** ++ !! 8.5706 *** +++ 
5 j31 + j32,5 10.7032 *** ++ 8.9207 *** +++ f31 + J32,5 +f33 + J34,5 15.1063 *** !!! 10.5726 *** 
6 j31 + j32,6 10.9935 *** + 9.1488 *** +++ j31 + j32,6 +f33 + f34.6 14.9378 *** !!! 10.5433 *** 
,_. 7 j31 + j32,7 10.3380 *** +++ 8.9593 *** +++ j31 + j32,7 +j33 + j34,7 12.5789 *** + ! ! ! 8.3359 *** +++ 
s 8 j31 + j32,8 10.6586 *** ++ 9.0813 *** +++ j31 + J32,a +j33 + j34,8 12.7637 *** + !!! 7.5163 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. ofObs. 96,868 65,601 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4717 0.5000 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, ! !, ! ! !: Significantly different from the !31 +{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 11 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Public Target versus Private Target (1% and 5% deal) 
Pane! A: ERC 
CARit = 0.1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + a.3PR]j +L~=1 a4,tQTit * PRh+ P1UEit + L~=1 fJz,tUEit * QTit + PJUE;t*PRI; + L~=1 fJ4tUEit * 
QTit * PRii+ Controlsit+ cit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 
QRT Public Target {1} {2} {1} {2} Private Target {1} {2} {3} 
0 PI 3.2619 *** 3.0403 *** /JI + p3 2.8664 *** 
1 PI+ /J2,I 1.5126 *** +++ 1.1102 *** +++ PI + /J2,I +{33 + /J4,I 2.3168 *** ++ !! 
2 /JI + p2,2 1.7581 *** +++ 1.7437 *** ++ PI + p2,2 +P3 + p4,2 1.5320 *** +++ 
3 /JI + p2,3 2.4034 *** 2.3968 *** /JI + fJ2.3 +f33 + P4.3 2.0147 *** +++ 
4 PI + P2.4 1.8559 *** ++ 1.8505 *** ++ PI + {32,4 +P3 +PM 1.3849 *** +++ 
5 PI+ p2,5 1.1481 *** +++ 1.1479 *** +++ /JI + p2,5 +{33 + p4,5 1.0426 *** +++ 
6 PI + /J2.6 1.3597 *** +++ 1.3558 *** +++ {JJ + p2,6 +{33 + fJM 1.0565 *** +++ 
7 PI+ p2,7 1.0524 *** +++ 1.0490 *** +++ PI + P2.7 +f33 + p4,7 0.9641 *** +++ 
8 PI + p2,8 1.6849 *** ++ 1.6805 *** ++ PI + {32,8 +P3 + p4,8 1.2792 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. ofObs. 42,305 36,863 
Adj. R-sqr 0.0341 0.0336 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++:Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the j31+j32 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.011eve1s, respectively (two-tailed). 
5% deal 
{1} {2} {3} 
2.5004 *** 
1.7356 *** +++ !! 
1.5219 *** +++ 
2.0021 *** + 
1.3745 *** +++ 
1.0371 *** +++ 
1.0474 *** +++ 
0.9591 *** +++ 
1.2712 *** +++ 
-0 
+:>. 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRJCEit = 0.1 + L~=l az,tQTit + a.3PRl; +:L~=l a4,tQTit * PRh+ PIEit + L~=lPz,tEit * QTit + PJEit*PRl; + L~=1P4tEit * 
QTit * PRii+ yJBVit +Cit 
QRT 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
Public Target (1) (2) (1) (2)_ _Private Targe_t _ ____ill_____Q). _ill _ _ (1) (2) (3) 
PI 12.3695 *** 11.1186 *** PI+ p3 11.9509 *** 10.0481 *** 
PI+ p2,I 4.8658 *** +++ 3.5289 *** +++ PI+ P2,1 +P3 + P4.I 7.9306 *** +++ !!! 5.3987 *** +++ !!! 
PI+ p2,2 11.9192 *** 10.0807 *** PI + p2,2 +P3 + p4,2 11.4269 *** 9.0608 *** ++ 
PI+P2.3 11.5877*** 10.2981*** PI+P2.3+P3+P4.3 11.1715*** + 8.3407*** +++ !!! 
PI+ P2.4 11.2043 *** 10.3806 *** PI+ P2.4 +P3 + p4,4 11.1517 *** + 8.7429 *** +++ !! 
PI + p2,5 10.9451 *** + 9.7178 *** + PI + p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 11.3430 *** 8.7822 *** ++ 
PI+ p2,6 11.3516 *** 9.8349 *** PI+ p2,6 +P3 + p4,6 11.5333 *** 9.0712 *** ++ 
PI+P2,7 12.4399*** 11.1330*** PI+P2.7+P3+P4.1 10.1578*** +++ !!! 8.1777*** +++ !!! 
PI+ p2,8 11.7539 *** 10.5249 *** PI+ p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 10.7395 *** +++ ! 8.3184 *** +++ !!! 
Year Effect YES YES 
No. of Obs. 96,868 65,601 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4718 0.5000 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!!:Significantly different from the !31+(32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Table 12 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: intra- versus inter-industry (1% and 5% deal) 
Pane! A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l az,tQTit + a1INT; +r~=1 a4,tQTit *INTi+ P1UEit + L~=1 fJz.tUEit * QTit + P1UEit*INT; + L~=1 fl4tUEit * 
QTit *INTi+ Controlsit+ Bit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
1% 5% 1% 5% 
QRT Intra-industry (1) (2) (1) (2) Inter-industry (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
0 PI 2.9489 *** 2.6383 *** PI+ p3 2.7169 *** ++ 2.4096 *** 
1 PI+ pl,I 2.1110 *** +++ 1.6742 *** +++ PI+ P2.1 +P3 + p4,I 2.8099 *** 1.2123 *** +++ 
2 PI+ p2,2 1.6729 *** +++ 1.6604 *** +++ PI+ p2,2 +P3 + p4,2 1.7173 *** ++ 1.7073 *** 
3 PI+ p2,3 2.0862 *** 2.0718 *** +++ PI + p2,3 +P3 + p4,3 2.2455 *** 2.2388 *** 
4 PI+ p2,4 1.5775 *** ++ 1.5662 *** ++ PI+ P2.4 +P3 +PM 1.1910 *** +++ 1.1765 *** +++ 
...... 5 PI+ P2,5 1.1200 *** +++ 1.1136 *** +++ PI+ p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 0.9802 *** +++ 0.9744 *** +++ 
5; 6 PI+ p2,6 1.2510 *** +++ 1.2412 *** +++ PI+ P2.6 +P3 +PM 0.4899 *** +++ !! 0.4800 *** +++ 
7 PI+ p2,7 0.9509 *** +++ 0.9452 *** +++ PI+ p2,7 +P3 + p4,7 2.1849 *** !! 2.1719 *** !! 
8 PI+ p2,8 1.3714 *** ++ 1.3628 *** +++ PI+ p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 1.3994 *** +++ 1.3894 *** ++ !! 
Year YES YES Effect 
No. of 41,890 36,500 
Obs. 
Adj. R- 0.0345 0.034 
sqr 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01leve1s, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the ~l+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the !31+{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + a3lNT; +L~=l a4,tQTit *INTi+ P1Eit + L~=1 fJz,tEit * QTit + P3Eit*INT; + L~=1 f14tEit * 
QTit *INTi+ y1BVit + eit 
-0 
0'1 
QRT 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
Intra-industry (1) (2) (1) (2) Inter-industry (1) (2)_(3) _ (1) (2) (3) 
P1 12.1111 *** 10.7209 *** P1 + p3 9.3045 *** 6.8391 *** 
P1+P2.1 7.1715*** +++ 4.9387*** +++ P~+P2.1+P3+P4.1 5.1638*** +++ !!! 2.7607*** +++ !!! 
P1 + P2.2 11.7959 *** 9.6378 *** ++ P1 + P2.2 +P3 + P4.2 8.7202 *** !!! 6.6148 *** !!! 
P1 + P2.3 11.3237 *** ++ 9.1208 *** +++ P1 + P2.3 +P3 + p4,3 9.4590 *** !! 6.0271 *** !!! 
P1 + P2.4 11.4878 *** + 9.6904 *** ++ P1 + P2.4 +P3 + P4.4 8.0835 *** ! ! ! 5.6218 *** ! ! ! 
P1 + P2.5 11.4832 *** + 9.1323 *** +++ P1 + P2.5 +P3 + p4,5 8.0230 *** !!! 7.1479 *** !! 
P1 + p2,6 11.6795 *** 9.6800 *** ++ P1 + P2.6 +P3 + p4,6 8.4811 *** ! ! ! 5.1798 *** ! ! ! 
P1+Pv 10.6991*** +++ 8.9830*** +++ PJ+fi2.7+fi3+P4,7 8.6803*** !! 6.5357*** !!! 
pl + p2,8 11.4102 *** + 9.3389 *** +++ pl + p2,8 +fi3 + p4,8 7.1303 *** ++ !!! 5.7687 *** !!! 
Year YES YES Effect 
No. of 95,842 64,920 
Obs. 
Adj. R- 0.4752 0.5052 
sqr 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, ! !, ! ! ! : Significantly different from the !31 +!32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Table 13 Change of the ERC and Valuation around M&A: Synergy-motivated versus Agency-motivated acquirers (1% 
and 5% deal) 
Pane/A: ERG 
CARit = 0.1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + a.JAGM +L~=l a4 ,tQTit * AGNi+ P1UEit + L~=1 fJz,tUEit * QTit + P1UEit*AGN; 
+ L~=lfl4tUEit * QTit * AGNi+ Controlsit+ Bit 
QRT 
0 
1 
2 
3 
- 4 ~ 5 
6 
7 
8 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
1% 5% 1% 5% 
Synergy acquirer 0) G) _ __(1) (2) Agency acquirer (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
[JJ 3.5439 *** 3.5971 *** /h + /33 2.8169 *** ++ 2.5651 *** 
/h +/hi 2.2438 *** +++ 1.7912 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +/33 + /34.1 1.9709 *** ++ 1.8739 *** ++ 
[JJ + /32,2 1.3989 *** +++ 1.3696 *** +++ [JJ + /32.2 +/33 + /34.2 1.8257 *** +++ 1.8372 *** ++ 
[JJ + /32,3 2.2111 *** +++ 2.1915 *** +++ [JJ + /32,3 +/33 + /34,3 2.0709 *** ++ 2.0717 *** 
[JJ + /32.4 1.7441 *** +++ 1.7257 *** +++ [JJ + /32.4 +/33 + /34.4 1.5817 *** +++ 1.5826 *** +++ 
/31 + fJ2.s 1.3875 *** +++ 1.3830 *** +++ /31 + /32.s +/33 + /34.5 0.8141 *** +++ !!! 0.8143 *** +++ !!! 
[JJ + /32,6 1.0848 *** +++ 1.0712 *** +++ [JJ + /32,6 +/33 + /34,6 1.1764 *** +++ 1.1734 *** +++ 
[JJ + /32,7 1.1531 *** +++ 1.1113 *** +++ [JJ + /32,7 +/33 + /34,7 1.2195 *** +++ 1.2387 *** +++ 
/31 + /32,8 1.2856 *** +++ 1.2589 *** +++ [JJ + /32,8 +/33 + /34,8 1.2964 *** +++ 1.3023 *** +++ 
Year 
Effect YES 
No. of 33,790 
Obs. 
YES 
31,740 
Adj. R-sqr 0.0368 0.0364 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!!:Significantly different from the !31+(32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
-0 
00 
Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = 0.1 + }::~=1 az,tQTit + o.JAGM +}::~=1 a4,tQTit * AGNi+ P1Eit + I~=1Pz,tEit * QTit + PJEit*AGN; + I~=1P4tEit * 
QTit * AGNi+ yJBV;t +Cit 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
1% deal 5% deal 1% deal 5% deal 
QRT Synergy acquirer (1) (2) (1) (2) Agency acquirer (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
0 {JI 11.8077 *** 11.0904 *** {JJ + {33 10.7267 *** 10.3120 *** 
1 {JJ + {32,1 6.6969 *** +++ 5.8607 *** +++ {JJ + {32,1 +{33 + {34,1 4.8817 *** +++ ! ! ! 3.9793 *** +++ ! ! ! 
2 {JJ + {32,2 11.6045 *** 10.5157 *** {JJ + {32,2 +{33 + {34,2 10.1749 *** !! 8.9930 *** ++ !! 
3 {JJ+[J2,3 11.4194*** 9.8547*** + {JJ+[J2,3 +{J3+[J4,3 9.7946*** !!! 8.1121*** +++ !!! 
4 {JJ + {32,4 10.6121 *** + 9.4569 *** ++ {JJ + {32,4 +{33 + {34,4 9.7969 *** 8.8447 *** ++ 
5 {JJ + {32,5 10.8087 *** 9.7923 *** ++ {JJ + {32,5 +{33 + {34,5 9.9731 *** 8.6285 *** +++ !! 
6 {JJ + {32,6 10.8000 *** 9.9402 *** + {JJ + {32,6 +{33 + {34,6 9.3138 *** ++ !!! 8.2343 *** +++ !!! 
7 {JJ + {32,7 9.8676 *** +++ 9.0778 *** +++ {JJ + {32,7 +{33 + {34,7 9.4483 *** ++ 8.6835 *** +++ 
8 {JJ + {32,8 9.6954 *** +++ 8.3248 *** +++ {JJ + {32,8 +{33 + {34,8 10.1764 *** 8.8415 *** ++ 
Year YES YES Effect 
No. of 70,111 58,821 
Obs. 
Adj. R- 0.484 0.4951 
sqr 
(1) *, **, ***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++:Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
(3) !, !! , !!!:Significantly different from the !31+!32 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
Table 14 Change of the ERC around M&A (Full sample) 
Pane/A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + P1UE;t + L~=1 Pz,tUEit * QTit +Contra/sit+ cit 
where Contra/sit= y1MBit + y 2SIZEit + y3LOSSit + Y4Q4it + y5EA_LAGit + y7DEALSIZEit 
Change of Coefficient on UE Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Pred. Coeff. (1) ERC (1) (2) 
Sign 
0 P1 + 3.0217 *** P1 3.0217 *** 
1 Pv -0.6649 ** P1 + Pv 2.3568 *** ++ 
2 p2,2 -1.3435 *** P1 + p2,2 1.6782 *** +++ 
3 Pv -1.1310 *** P1 + P2.3 1.8907 *** +++ 
4 P2.4 -1.5377 *** P1 + P2.4 1.4840 *** +++ 
5 P2.5 -1.8805 *** P1 + P2.5 1.1412 *** +++ 
6 P2.6 -1.8491 *** P1 + P2.6 1.1726 *** +++ 
7 P2.7 -1.9437 *** P1 + P2.7 1.0780 *** +++ 
8 P2.8 -1.7742 *** P1 + P2.s 1.2475 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. of Obs. 62,070 
Adj. R-sqr 0.0320 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the .f31+{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Valuation 
Change of Coefficient on E Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Pred. Coeff. (1) Val. (1) (2) 
Sign 
0 fh + 12.9512 *** fh 10.7697 *** 
1 {hi -5.0358 *** /h + Pv 7.9154 *** +++ 
2 P2.2 -1.1401 *** PI+ P2.2 11.8111 *** +++ 
3 P2.3 -1.4071 *** PI+ P2.3 11.5441 *** +++ 
4 PM -1.4125 *** PI+P2.4 11.5388 *** +++ 
5 p2,5 -1.3501 *** PI+ p2,5 11.6011 *** +++ 
6 P2.6 -1.7028 *** PI+ P2.6 11.2484 *** +++ 
7 /h7 -2.0012 *** PI+ p2,7 10.9500 *** +++ 
8 P2.8 -2.4290 *** PI+ p2,8 10.5222 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 121,290 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4529 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++,+++:Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!!:Significantly different from the .{31+.{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 15 Change of the ERC around M&A: Domestic Target versus Foreign Target 
(Full sample) 
Pane! A: ERC 
CARit = a.1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a.3FORi +.L~=l a 4,tQTit *FORi+ P1UEu + L~=tPz,tUEit * 
QTit + P3UEit*FOR; + L~=lP4tUEit * QTit *FORi+ Controlsit+ eit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Domestic Target (1) (2) Foreign Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 [JJ 2.9189 *** [JJ + [33 3.51801 *** 
1 [JJ + /J2.1 2.2972 *** +++ /JI + /J2.1 +{J3 + /J4,1 2.42147 *** + 
2 [JJ + [32,2 1.5405 *** +++ [31 + /J2.2 +[33 +Po 2.62989 *** !!! 
3 [JJ + /J2,3 1.8976 *** +++ /JI + /J2,3 +{J3 + /J4,3 2.05242 *** +++ 
4 [JJ + /J2.4 1.3141 *** +++ /JI + [32,4 +{J3 + /J4,4 2.35825 *** ++ !!! 
5 /JI + /J2,5 1.2449 *** +++ /JI + /J2,5 +{J3 + /J4,5 0.74221 *** +++ !! 
6 [JJ + [32,6 1.0221 *** +++ [JJ + /J2.6 +[33 + [34,6 1.9230 *** +++ !!! 
7 [JJ + [32,7 0.9481 *** +++ [JJ + [32,7 +[33 + /J4,7 1.66425 *** +++ !!! 
8 [JJ + [32,8 1.2180 *** +++ /JI + /J2,8 +{J3 + /J4,8 1.2068 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 59,608 
Adj. R-sqr 0.033 
(1) *, **,***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the Pl+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, ! !, ! ! !: Significantly different from the !31 +(32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + a3FOR; +:L~=l a4 ,tQTit *FORi+ P1Eit + L~=1 Pz,tEit * 
QTit + P£;t*FOR; + L~=lP4tEit * QTit *FORt+ YIBVit + eit 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Domestic Target (1) (2) Foreign Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 /h 12.1833 *** /31 + /33 15.8870 *** ! ! 
1 /31 + /32,1 7.2934 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +/33 + /34,1 10.7555 *** +++ ! ! 
2 /31 + /32,2 11.1553 *** +++ /31 + /32.2 +{33 + /34,2 15.2415 *** ! ! 
3 /31 + /32.3 11.0364 *** +++ /31 + /32,3 +/33 + /34,3 12.7316 *** +++ ! 
4 /31 + /32,4 11.0008 *** +++ /31 + /32,4 +/33 + /34.4 13.5274 *** ++ ! ! 
5 /31 + /32,5 11.1369 *** +++ /31 + /32.5 +/33 + /34.5 13.5634 *** ++ ! ! 
6 /31 + /32,6 10.6774 *** +++ /31 + /32,6 +/33 + /34.6 14.2848 *** ! ! 
7 /31 + /32,7 10.6439 *** +++ /31 + /32,7 +/33 + /34,7 13.0689 *** +++ ! ! 
8 /31 + /32,8 10.1727*** +++ /31 + /32,8 +{33 + /34,8 11.5839 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 117,470 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4585 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++:Significantly different from the P1+P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the .131+(32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 16 Change of the ERC around M&A: Public Target versus Private Target 
(Full sample) 
Panel A : ERC 
CARit = a.1 + L~=l az,tQTit + a.3PRl; +I~=l a4,tQTit * PR!i+ P1UE;t + L~=1Pz,tUEit * 
QTit + PJUE;t*PRI; + L~=1 P4tUEit * QTit * PRii+ Controlsit+ cit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Public Target (1) (2) Private Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 pi 3.0575 *** Pi+ P3 2.7720 *** 
1 Pi+ P2.1 2.3255 *** +++ Pi + P2.i +P3 + P4.i 2.6677 *** 
2 Pi+ P2.2 1.8148 *** +++ Pi + P2.2 +P3 + P4.2 1.5695 *** +++ 
3 Pi+ P2.3 1.9064 *** +++ Pi + P2.3 +P3 + P4.3 2.2246 *** 
4 Pi+ P2.4 1.7043 *** +++ Pi + P2.4 +P3 + P4.4 0.8241 *** +++ !!! 
5 Pi+ P2.s 1.2175 *** +++ Pi + P2.s +P3 + P4.s 1.0937 *** +++ 
6 pi+ p2,6 1.3098 *** +++ Pi + P2.6 +P3 + P4.6 0.6345 *** +++ !! 
7 pi+ p2,7 1.0803 *** +++ pi + P2.1 +P3 + P4.7 1.9025 *** ++ !! 
8 pi+ p2,8 1.4313 *** +++ Pi + P2.8 +P3 + P4.8 0.6816 *** +++ !! 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 61,486 
Adj . R-sqr 0.0325 
(1) *, **, ***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.01leve1s, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++:Significantly different from the ~1+~3 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the !31+!32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit =a]+ Lr=1 a2,tQTit + a3PR1i +Lr=1 a4,tQTit * PR/i+ PJEit + L~=1fJ2,tEit * 
QTit + P£it*PRii + L~=1 fJ4tEit * QTit * PRii+ y1BVit + eit 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Public Target (1) (2) Private Target (1) (2) (3) 
0 !h 11.6136 *** /31 + /33 13.1986 *** ** 
1 /31 + /32,1 5.0636 *** +++ /31 + /32,1 +{33 + /34,1 8.7196 *** +++ II! 
2 /31 + /32,2 11.4793 *** /31 + /32,2 +/33 + /34,2 11.7271 *** +++ 
3 {JJ + {32,3 11.3456 *** /31 + /32,3 +{33 + /34,3 11.4578 *** +++ 
4 /31 + {32,4 11.0600 *** /31 + {32,4 +{33 + {34,4 11.4780 *** +++ 
5 /31 + /32,5 10.5245 *** /31 + /32,5 +{33 + /34,5 11.7544 *** +++ !! 
6 /31 + /32,6 11.1002 *** /31 + {32,6 +{33 + {34,6 11.2155 *** +++ 
7 /31 + /32,7 12.3257 *** /31 + {32,7 +{33 + /34,7 10.7747 *** +++ !! 
8 /31 + /32,8 10.8714 *** /31 + /32,8 +{33 + /34,8 10.3226 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 118,599 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4542 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the IH +~3 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the _131+[32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 17 Change of the ERC around M&A: intra- versus inter-industry (Full 
sample) 
Pane/A: ERC 
CARit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3COM; +:E~=l a 4,tQTit * COMi+ P1UE;, + L~=1 /l2,tUEit * 
QTit + P3UE;,*INT; + L~=i fl4tUEit * QTit *INTi+ Contra/sit+ cit 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Intra-industry (1) (2) Inter-industry (1) (2) (3) 
0 PI 3.3816 *** PI+ p3 3.00581 *** 
1 PI+ p2,I 2.5932 *** ++ PI + P2.1 +P3 + p4,I 2.2384 *** ++ 
2 PI+ p2,2 1.3928 *** +++ PI + Pv +P3 + P4.2 2.09212 *** +++ !!! 
3 PI+ p2,3 1.9566 *** +++ PI + p2,3 +P3 + p4,3 2.04367 *** +++ 
4 PI+ p2,4 1.8135 *** +++ PI + p2,4 +P3 +PM 1.54339 *** +++ 
5 PI+ P2.5 1.3696 *** +++ PI + P2.5 +P3 + p4,5 0.9411 *** +++ !! 
6 PI+ /h6 1.0750 *** +++ PI + p2,6 +P3 + p4,6 1.39024 *** +++ 
7 PI+ p2,7 0.9949 *** +++ PI + Pv +P3 + /h7 1.57948 *** +++ !! 
8 PI+ p2,8 1.3243 *** +++ PI + p2,8 +P3 + p4,8 1.2306 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 54,061 
Adj . R-sqr 0.0340 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the P1 +P3 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !! , !!!:Significantly different from the .131+{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=l a 2,tQTit + a3lNTi +:L~=l a 4,tQTit *INTi+ PzEit + L~=l fJz,tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit*INT; + L~=1P4tEit * QTit *INTi+ yJBV;t + Git 
QRT Intra-industry (1) 
0 fh 13.0149 *** 
1 [JJ + P2.1 8.0000 *** 
2 [JJ + [J2,2 12.0045 *** 
3 [JJ + [J2,3 11.7459 *** 
4 [JJ +fJ2,4 11.6887 *** 
5 [JJ +[J2,5 11.6992 *** 
6 [JJ +[J2,6 11.5237 *** 
7 [JJ + [J2,7 11.1110 *** 
8 [JJ + [J2,8 10.9907 *** 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
(2) Inter-industry 
[JJ+ [JJ 
+++ P1 + P2.1 +P1 + P4.1 
+++ [JJ + [J2,2 +[JJ + [J4,2 
+++ [JJ + p2,3 +[JJ + [J4,3 
+++ fJJ + p2,4 +fJJ + P4.4 
+++ P1 + P2.5 +P1 + P4.5 
+++ [JJ + p2,6 +[JJ + [J4,6 
+++ P1 + P2.7 +fJ1 + P4,7 
+++ [JJ + [J2,8 +[JJ + p4,8 
Year Effect 
No. ofObs. 
(1) (2) (3) 
10.5666 *** "' 
5.8600 *** +++ 
8.7225 *** + 
8.7392 *** + 
9.4388 *** 
9.2885 *** 
7.6786 *** +++ 
8.6236 *** + 
7.1640 *** +++ 
YES 
120,021 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4587 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the J3l+J33 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!!:Significantly different from the 131+132 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Table 18 Change of the ERC around M&A: Synergy-motivated versus Agency-
motivated acquirers (Full sample) 
Pane/A: ERC 
CARit = a.1 + L~=l a2,tQTit + a.3AGN; +L~=l a 4,tQTit * AGNi+ P1UEit + L~=1 Pz,tUEit * 
QTit + P3UEu*AGN; + L~=1 P4tUEit * QTit * AGNi+ Controlsit+ C:it 
Sum of Coefficients on UE 
QRT Synergy acquirer (1) (2) Agency acquirer (1) (2) (3) 
0 /h 3.4669 *** Pi+P3 3.0345 *** 
1 Pi+ P2.1 2.4406 *** +++ Pi + P2.i +P3 + P4.i 2.0449 *** +++ 
2 PI+ p2,2 1.4465 *** +++ Pi + P2.2 +P3 + p4,2 1.8126 *** +++ 
3 pi+ p2,3 2.2610 *** +++ Pi + P2.3 +P3 + P4.3 2.0378 *** +++ 
4 Pi+ P2.4 1.7651 *** +++ Pi + P2.4 +P3 + P4.4 1.5746 *** +++ 
5 Pi+ P2.s 1.3996 *** +++ PI + p2,5 +P3 + p4,5 0.8053 *** +++ !! 
6 Pi + P2.6 1.0927 *** +++ Pi + P2.6 +P3 + P4.6 1.1874 *** +++ 
7 Pi + P2.7 1.1658 *** +++ Pi + P2.7 +P3 + P4.7 1.2220 *** +++ 
8 pi+ p2,8 1.3518 *** +++ Pi + P2.a +P3 + P4.a 1.2506 *** +++ 
Year Effect YES 
No. ofObs. 33,710 
Adj. R-sqr 0.0369 
(1) *, **, ***: Significantly different from zero at 0.1 , 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the ~1 +~3 at 0.1 , 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, ! !, ! ! !: Significantly different from the 131+132 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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Panel B: Valuation 
PRICEit = a1 + L~=1 a2,tQTit + a3AGN; +r~=l a4,tQTit * AGNi+ P1Eit + L~=1 P2,tEit * 
QTit + P3Eit*AGN; + L~=1P4tEit * QTit * AGNt+ YJBVit +Cit 
Sum of Coefficients on E 
QRT Synergy Acquirer (1) (2) Agency Acquirer (1) (2) (3) 
0 /]J 11.7840 *** /]J + /33 10.7858 *** 
1 /]J + /]2,1 6.7853 *** +++ /]J + /]2,1 +/]3 + /]4,1 4.9965 *** +++ !!! 
2 /]J + /32,2 11.8861 *** /]J + /32,2 +/]3 + /34.2 10.2840 *** !!! 
3 /]J + /]2,3 10.9999 *** /]J + /]2,3 +/]3 + /]4,3 9.4207 *** ++ !!! 
4 /]J + /32,4 10.6770 *** + /]J + /]2,4 +/]3 + /34,4 9.9722 *** 
5 /]1 + /]2,5 11.0995 *** /]J + /]2,5 +/]3 + /34.5 9.8027 *** !! 
6 /]J + /]2,6 10.7931 *** /]J + /]2,6 +/]3 + /34.6 9.2011 *** +++ !!! 
7 /]J + /]2,7 10.4644 *** ++ /]J + /]2,7 +/]3 + /]4,7 9.6898 *** + 
8 /]J + /]2,8 9.4186 *** +++ /]J + /]2,8 +/]3 + /]4,8 9.6673 *** + 
Year Effect YES 
No. of Obs. 69,864 
Adj. R-sqr 0.4829 
(1) *, **,***:Significantly different from zero at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01levels, respectively (two-
tailed). 
(2) +, ++, +++: Significantly different from the f31+f33 at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
(3) !, !!, !!! : Significantly different from the j31+{32 at 0.1, 0.05, and O.Ollevels, respectively 
(two-tailed). 
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